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DICTA

MUNICIPAL TORT IMMUNITY
IN
COLORADO
By E. R. ARCHAMBEAU, JR.t
This note was awarded the 1960 Omar E. Garwood Memorial
Prize of $100 in a competition sponsored by the Association of Colorado Claimants' Attorneys.
The daily life of the average citizen is more closely associated
with municipal governments than with the higher tiers of governmental authority. The citizen's more immediate public needs are
provided by many various municipal agencies such as the police,
fire, street, water and sewage departments. If he encounters trouble, he calls on the city for assistance; if he is in trouble, the city usually calls upon him. In short, as far as government is concerned,
the average citizen's life revolves around the municipality in which
he lives.
This constant encountering of municipal government inevitably
leads to many conflicts resulting in a multitude of real, or imagined,
causes of action being brought by private citizens against their city.
Because of the special cloak of immunity which the law has granted
to governments, the irate citizen sometimes finds, to his dismay,
that he is "unable to get justice." This cloak of immunity confronting the citizen was draped over governments as early as the 16th
Century,'
and was maximized by the slogan "The king can do no
2
wrong.

Colorado is not alone in the field of municipal immunity. All
jurisdictions recognize it to varying extents.3 Colorado itself has
had well over one hundred cases at the appellate level in which the4
question of municipal tort immunity-or liability-was involved.
The purpose of this note is to examine the principal Colorado cases
on this subject and to arrange
5 them into a semblance of categories
for a comparative evaluation.
GOVERNMENTAL V. CORPORATE ACTS

Colorado's first cases on the subject quickly established the
municipality's immunity for acts in its governmental capacity, and
its possible liability for negligence in its ministerial or corporate
f Mr. Archambeau is a student at the University of Denver College of Law.

1 Russell v. Devon County, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788)

is reputed to be the earliest

reported case establishing this maxim.
2 Black, Low Dictionary (4th ed. 1951) says: "It does not mean that everything done by the
government is just and lawful, but that whatever is exceptionable in the conduct of public affairs is
not to be imputed to the king."
3 A leading single-volume text devoted exclusively to municipal low is Rhyne, Municipal Law
(1957). Chapter 30 of this book is devoted entirely to tort liability. Reference is made in the footnotes
in this chapter to many authoritative cases, works and law review articles covering all facets of
municipal tort liability.
4 Every reported Colorado case up through April 15, 1960, is noted herein either by a footnote or

in the text. In order to keep the note within reasonable limits, extensive use is made of the footnotes
to inform the reader what the general subject is in those casesnot discussed within the text. All cases
discussed are found within the West Publ. Co.

Key Number System as "Municipal Corporations, Nos.

723-857."
5 It is hoped that this original compilation of all Colorado cases will be of some small assistance
to members of the profession. Par sake of brevity, nothing is said about the usual tort defenses such
as contributory negligence and proximate cause.
Most cases on any given area contain sufficient
reference to such issues to guide any attorney confronted with a municipal tort question.
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acts.6 Colorado's legal history in this field has steadily grown, with
many modifications and with some apparent cycles up to the present time.
in building, 7
It has long been settled9 that the work10 of a city
12
11
8
maintaining, and repairing its buildings, streets, sidewalks,
6
7
8
13
14
15
viaducts, bridges, parks, street lights, sewers, dumps, flood

control projects, 9 and other similar ventures, 20 are purely municipal
and corporate duties. Such corporate duties or functions, therefore,
if performed negligently are not protected by governmental immunity. 21 Obviously most contests arise from activities within the
municipality's boundaries; but liability has been found also where
in corporate functions outside of its
the municipality was engaged
22
corporate boundary limits.
It will be noted that all of the above corporate duties or functions are acts which have been entered into or executed by the
municipality. A distinction is made in all pertinent Colorado decisions between those acts which are merely in the planning stage, or
not as yet conceived, and those acts which are either being executed
or are executed already. An early case 24 clearly pointed out this
distinction:
As long as the city authorities fail or refuse to exercise
their discretionary powers, no liability attaches; but if that
power be exercised . . . to the strict performance of whatever ministerial duties may be incident thereto, the city is
bound; and
for any failure in that respect it cannot escape
24
liability.

6 City of Denver v. Dunsmore, 7 Colo. 328, 3 Pac. 705 (1884) (excellent discussion of common low
history); City of Denver v. Capelli, 4 Colo. 25 (1877) (the distinction must be kept steadily in mind);
Doniels v. City of Denver, 2 Colo. 669 (1875).
7 E.g., McAuliffe v. City of Victor, 15 Colo. Aop. 337, 62 Pac. 231 (1900) (dictum); McCord v. City
of Pu-blo, 5 Colo. App. 48, 36 Poc. 1109 (1894) (river levee).
SE.q., City of Sterling v. Ancioux, 112 Colo. 381, 149 P.2d 174 (1944) (ice hrzard on sidewalk
rrent-d by city's street washer); LeMarr v. City of Colorado Springs, 95 Colo. 244, 35 P.2d 497 (1934)
(call;-ion with rity street sweeper); City and County of Denver v. Mourer. 47 Colo. 209, 106 Pac. 875
(1910) (pedestrian struck by hose being usad by city street cleaners): City of Denver v. Peterson, 5
Cola. App. 41, 36 Par. 1111 (1894) (plaintiff's horsp friohtened bv city's steam roller).
9 E.a., Arps v. City and County of Denver, P? Colo. 189. 257 Pac. 1094 (19271 (alley); City and
County of Denv-r, 68 Colo. 194. 188 Pac. 728 (1920) (sidewalk); Citv and County of Denver v. Moaivnay, J4 Colo. 157, 96 Pac. 1002 (1908) (sidewalk); City of Fort Collins v. Yetter, 38 Colo. 87, 89 Pac.
777 (1906) (str-t)
10 City and County of Denver v. Austria, 136 Colo. 454, 318 P.2d 1103 (1957) (fen.'. across steas
of ;#v hall); City of Colorado Springs y. Colburn, 102 Colo. 483, 81 P.2d 397 (1938) (slick floor in city
building).
11 E.g., City of Denver v. Dunsmore, 7 Cola. 328, 3 Pac. 705 (1884); McAuliffe v. City of Victor, 15
Colo. Aop. 337, 62 Pac. 231 (1900) (dictum).
12 E.g., City of Denver v. Dean, 10 Colo. 375, 16 Poc. 30 (1887); City of Denver v. Cochran, 17
Colo. App. 72, 67 Pac. 23 (1902).
13 Pueblo v. Mace, 132 Colo. 89, 284 P.2d 596 (1955); City of Pueblo v. Smith, 57 Colo. 500, 143
Pac. 281 (1914); City of Denver v. Baldasari, 15 Colo. Apa. 157, 61 Pac. 190 (1900).
14 City of Denver v. Dunsmore, 7 Colo. 328, 3 Pac. 705 (1884).
15 E.g., Williams v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567, 129 P.2d 110 (1942) (dictum). In this jurisdiction a municipality operating a public park does so in a proprietary capacity.
16 Oliver v. City of Denver, 13 Colo. App. 345, 57 Pac. 729 (1899) (dictum).
17 E.g., City and County of Denver v. Mason, 88 Colo. 294, 295 Pac. 788 (1931) (storm sewer
backed up).
1S City of Denver v. Porter, 126 Fed. 293 (8th Cir. 1903). Compare City of Denver v. Davis, 37
Colo. 370, 86 Pac. 1027 (1906) (city-owned dump) with Esquibel v. City and County of Denver, 112
Colo. 546, 151 P.2d 757 (1944) (city property used with authority) and City and County of Denver v.
Ristau, 95 Colo. 118, 33 P.2d 387 (1934) (dump on private land).
l:t E.g., City and County of Denver v. Tolarico, 99 Colo. 178, 61 P.2d 1 (1936).
20 E.g., City of Longmont v. Swearingen, 81 Colo. 246, 254 Pac. 1000 (1927) (swimming pool).
21 See subsequent discussion in text where each of these functions is discussed more fully.
22 E.g., Mill v. City of Fort Collins, 106 Colo. 229, 104 P.2d 143 (1940) (city-owned steam shovel
working outside of city); City and County of Denver v. St. James Touring Car & Taxicab Co., 68 Colo.
203, 188 Pac. 734 (1920) (city engaged in road work on mountain road leading to city's mountain
park).
":3 City of Denver v. Copelli, 4 Colo. 25 (1877) (sewer backed up).
24 Id. at 26-27.
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Other cases2 5 have rigorously adhered to this distinction.

Thus it is seen that where a municipal function is clearly ministerial or private, immunity is granted so long as the governmental
authorities have not yet acted. This immunity is lifted, however,
whenever the municipality does act; and it will then be held accountable for its subsequent negligence.
The other side of the coin, where a function of the municipality
is clearly governmental, is best defined by considering which acts
the courts have held to be governmental in nature. Discussion of
this aspect is postponed until the conclusion of this note, for it is in
this area where the26 most significant developments have been found
in recent decisions.

STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

One area in which there has been much conflict is the interpretation and application of the state statutes and city ordinances requiring an injured citizen to comply with certain filing procedures
as a prerequisite to bringing formal complaint against a municipal
tort-feasor. Many suits, perhaps valid in all other respects, have
been summarily tossed out of court merely because the plaintiff
failed to comply with one or the other of these legislative requirements. Strict compliance with the proper regulation, whether it is a
state statute or a city ordinance, is the only sure way of at least
staying in court. With but one exception, 27 our appellate courts have
demanded reasonable compliance with both types of these regulations.
The state, it appears, initiated the first formal notice requirement in 1891.28 The statute currently in effect has remained substantially the same since 1903.29 The current statute 30 provides:
No action for the recovery of compensation for personal injury or death against any city ...

on account of its

negligence, shall be maintained unless written notice of the
25 E.g., City and County of Denver v. Talorico, 99 Colo. 178, 61 P.2d 1 (1936) which held that in
determining the policy and character of construction work to be performed, the city is acting in its
governmental capacity, but in the performance of ministerial work, the city is liable for its negligence;
City and County of Denver v. Mason, 88 Cola. 294, 295 Pac. 788 (1931) which held there is no legal
duty upon the city to construct, but in construction and maintenance the city acts in its ministerial
capacity; City of Denver v. Dunsmore, 7 Colo. 328, 3 Pac. 705 (1884); Daniels v. City of Denver, 2
Colo. 669 (1875) (distinguished in Dunsmore, supra).
26 See text at note 171 infra.
27 See text at note 39 infra.
28 Cola. Sess. Laws 1891, § 14, pg. 382.
29 Colo. Sess. Laws 1903, ch. 175, 1 1.
30 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 139-35-1 (1953).
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time, place and cause of injury is given to the clerk.., by
the person injured, his agent or attorney, within ninety
days and the action is commenced within two years from
the occurrence of the accident ....
The notice . . . shall not be deemed invalid or insuf-

ficient solely by reason of any inaccuracy in stating the
time, place or cause of injury, if it is shown that there was
no intention to mislead and that the city council . . .was,

in fact, not misled thereby.
The City of Denver followed suit. in 189331 with a section of its
charter providing requirements much like those of the state. The
same requirements have been substantially maintained through the
years and are currently found in the Charter for the City and County of Denver.3 - This charter provision requires that:
Before the city and county shall be liable for damages
to any person injured upon any of the streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks or other public places of the city and county,
the person so injured or someone on his behalf, shall, within
sixty days after receiving such injuries, give the mayor notice, in writing of such injuries, stating fully in such notice,
when, where and how the injuries occurred and the extent
thereof.
Judging from occasional remarks in the reported cases, it would
seem that many of the other cities within the state also have adopted similar provisions in their charters or ordinances.
It is readily apparent that there are several conflicts between
the two quoted regulations. Aside from differences in the time limit
and the party to be notified, it will be noted that the state imposes
a limitation period of two years whereas Denver does not. It is of
extreme importance to note that the two-year limitation of the
statute applies to actions against the City and County of Denver for
personal injuries caused by negligence.33 This is because there is no
conflict between the two regulations in this respect. Of equal significance are the lesser requirements for details of the accident
found in the statute as compared to those requirements in Denver's
charter. The question is when does the statute apply, and when
does the charter apply? Article XX of Colorado's Constitution provides that charters and ordinances of municipalities dealing with
local and municipal matters shall supersede any state law in conflict with such charters and ordinances34 The city regulations,
therefore, govern the notice requirements, but only when they are
in conflict with the statutory requirements. If there is no conflict,
either the city or the state requirements may apply depending upon
the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
Obviously the Denver charter provisions apply only within its
corporate boundaries. But how inclusive is the phrase "or other
public places of the city and county"? In a personal injury suit involving an accident within the Denver municipal auditorium, the
Colorado Supreme Court ruled that the auditorium was not within
the scope of such public places.3 5 The court, in applying the usual
31 City of Denver Charter art.IX, 1 9 (1893).
32 City and County of Denver Charter art. VIII, § 158.
33 Dahlin v. City and County of Denver, 97 Colo. 239, 48 P.2d 1013 (1935).
34 Colo. Const. art. XX, § 6.
55 City and County of Denver v. Taylor, 88 Colo. 89, 292 Pac. 594 (1930).
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rules of statutory interpretation, thought that the legislative intent
was to include only such other public, places of the same generic
class as streets, avenues, alleys and sidewalks. This holding is followed, at least by implication, in City of Colorado Springs v. Colburn,36 where a personal injury action was filed under the state
statute even though the accident occurred in the business office of
the municipally-owned power company.
This interpretation of "public places" was again reinforced in
Horst v. City and County of Denver, 7 where the plaintiff was injured while standing on the front steps of her home adjacent to the
sidewalk. This case also demonstrates the interrelation of the state
statutory provisions and those of the charter where the two are not
in conflict. The plaintiff contended that she had not filed the required notice since the accident had been in a private place, but
that the city ordinance without any limitation clause pre-empted
all application of the statute within the city limits. The city successfully argued that the two-year limitations clause of the state
statute was applicable. The court held that the statute was not in
conflict with the charter provisions, and was therefore applicable,
because the charter did
not encompass those accidents occurring
38
upon private property.
As mentioned above, with but one exception, the courts have
required that the plaintiff's notice fully comply with all of the provisions of the particular regulation in question. The court in City
36 102 Colo. 483, 81 P.2d 397 (1938).
37 101 Colo. 284, 73 P.2d 388 (1937).
3 Accord, Dahlin v. City and County of Denver, 97 Colo. 239, 48 P.2d 1013 (1935) (constitutionality
of state statute upheld). The constitutionality of notice requirements was also upheld in Cunningham v.
City of Denver, 23 Colo. 18, 45 Pac. 356 (1896) (it is no longer open to attack).
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of Colorado Springs v. Colburn 9 felt that the plaintiff had a meritorious defense for failing to file notice within the statutory period.
Despite the provisions of the statute expressly requiring that the
injured party or his agent or attorney notify the city clerk within
ninety days of such accident, the court dwelled at considerable
length upon the suffering which the plaintiff had endured, and then
concluded that the plaintiff had been so shaken that she was unable
to think clearly so as to protect her rights. The court did not even
discuss the possibility that the plaintiff could have engaged another
person to submit the notice for her. In disposing of the case in favor
of the plaintiff, the court said:
While respectable authority has held that under statutes similar to ours, a failure to give the required notice to
the city within the statutory time fixed cannot be excused,
and that the statute must be strictly construed, we are inclined to adopt what we conceive to be the more reasonable and humane rule . . . to the effect that under proper
circumstances of mental and physical incapacity, giving of
notice is excused, the question as to the sufficiency . . . to
be submitted to the jury .... 40
Despite the holding in Colburn, the court has held many times
that compliance with the conditions imposed by the statute or
municipal regulation is a prerequisite to the maintenance of a legal
action against the municipality involved. 41 It is of interest that the
Colburn case is not cited for this principle in any of the subsequent
Colorado cases involving sufficiency of notice in a tort action
against a municipality.
Lee v. City of Fort Morgan,42 although filed correctly as a
wrongful-death action, was dismissed for plaintiff's failure to file
43
any notice as required by the state statute. Similarly, another case
was dismissed when it was found that although the plaintiff had
fully complied with the requirements of a new notice statute, it had
been only recently enacted by the legislature and was not to become effective until the month following the accident.4 4 It is also
a possible cause for dismissal where, although proper notice of an
accident is filed with one city
official, the regulation requires that
45
a different officer be notified.
Two close cases are of particular interest. The plaintiff, in City
of Canon City v. Cox,4 6 instead of filing a notice with the city clerk
as required by statute, had served the mayor with a summons to
39 102 Colo. 483, 81 P.2d 397 (1938).
40 Id. at 486, 81 P.2d at 398.
41 E.g., Baker v. Town of Manitou, Colo., 277 Fed. 232 (8th Cir. 1921) (minors not exempt from
requirements); Armijo v. City and County of Denver, 123 Colo. 304, 228 P.2d 989 (1951); Fisher v.
City and County of Denver, 123 Colo. 158, 165, 225 P.2d 828, 830 (1950); Peek v. City of Lamar, 87
Colo. 107, 285 Pac. 168 (1930).
42 77 Colo. 135, 235 Pac. 348 (1925) where, by way of dictum, The court said that if an injured
party died after the 90-day period had expired, the injury being continuous, the notice period would
not begin to run until the date of death.
43 City of Colorado Springs v. Neville, 42 Colo. 219, 93 Pac. 1096 (1908). The earlier act required
a description of the extent of injuries and that the notice be filed with the mayor; whereas the new
act was to require filing with the city clerk, but did not require a description of the injuries.
44 See also Peek v. City of Lamar, 87 Colo. 107, 285 Pac. 168 (1930) where oral notice was
promptly given, but written notice was not filed until the 90-day period had elapsed.
45 Fisher v. City and County of Denver, 123 Colo. 158, 225 P.2d 828 (1950) (filed with city clerk
instead of with mayor as required) where it was said that the mayor cannot delegate another as his
agent for service; City of Denver v. Saulcey, 5 Colo. App. 420, 38 Pac. 1098 (1895) (filed with alderman) where the court, in dictum, said they might not have reversed judgment for the plaintiff had the
jury been instructed on this point and had the jury then found that the city had been notified in fact.
40 55 Colo. 264, 133 Pac. 1040 (1913).
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which was attached a copy of the complaint with all details therein.
The apparent turning point of the case was that the court felt there
had been sufficient compliance with the statute since the mayor had
promptly notified the city council and city clerk at an official town
meeting, and that the complaint had fully described the accident.
Powers v. City of Boulder 7 involved the question of whether the
mayor could waive the statutory requirement. The mayor had told
the plaintiff that he would accept the notice for and in behalf of
the city, and that it was not necessary for it to be given to the city
clerk as required by statute. The court, by a 4-3 decision, reversed in
favor of the plaintiff and remanded the cause for a new trial. The
dessenting faction of the court staunchly protested on the grounds
that the court could not legally excuse the statute's requirements,
the majority members of the court were anand, that in so doing,
4
nulling legislation. 8
The general import of most decisions concerning notice requirements is that the details of the accident must be given so that the
city officials may be advised of the injury so they may investigate
49
the accident promptly while evidence still may be easily acquired.
The extent of injuries sustained must be given in the notice"' as
51
Location of the accident scene
well as the cause of the accident.
52
must be accurately given, too.
It should be noted in passing that the City and County of Denver presently has an ordinance-' which provides for notice to be
given in complaints dealing with damage to property. This ordinance, for all practical purposes, is identical to the charter provision 4
dealing with personal injuries. No reported case was found which
dealt with property damage and this ordinance provision; but it
would seem that all that has been said about the personal injury
notice requirements will apply with equal force in property damage suits.
SIDEWALKS AND STREETS

Without question, the majority of reported Colorado cases involving municipal tort liability have been connected in some way
47 54 Colo. 558, 131 Pac. 395 (1913).
48 This case should be carefully compared with Fisher v. City and Count' of Denver, 123 Colo.
158, 225 P.2d 828 (1950) (judgment for city) in which Powers was distinguished.
49 E.g., Fisher v. City and County of Denver, supro note 48; City and County of Denver v. Perkins,
50 Colo. 159, 114 Poc. 484 (1911); City and County of Denver v. Bacon, 44 Colo. 166, 96 Pac. 974
(1908); City of Denver v. Bradbury, 19 Colo. App. 441, 75 Pac. 1077 (1904).
50 City of Denver v. Barron, 6 Colo. App. 72, 39 Pc. 989 (1895) which was reversed in favor of
the city because the notice had merely said internal injuries, but the trial court erroneously admitted
evidence showing that the plaintiff had suffered a miscarriage.
51 Beezley v. Olson, 129 Colo. 406, 270 P.2d 758 (1954) was dismissed on other grounds although
the court chose to ignore the discrepancy in the plaintiff's notice which gave the cause of the accident
as an icy sidewalk, whereas at the trial the plaintiff alleged that the sidewalk itself had been finished
too smoothly; City and County of Denver v. Bacon, 44 Colo. 166, 96 Pac. 974 (1908) where "torn up
and impassable condition of sidewalk" was held to sufficiently describe the cause of the accident;
Stoors v. City of Denver, 19 Colo. App. 159, 73 Pac. 1094 (1903) where judgment for the city was
affirmed because the plaintiff's notice failed to state that ice upon the sidewalk was the cause of
the accident.
52 City of Cripple Creek v. Loveless, 70 Colo. 482, 202 Pac. 705 (1921) where it was held sufficient
that the notice stated only that the accident had occurred between two certain cross streets on one
side of a given street; City and County of Denver v. Perkins, 50 Cola. 159, 114 Pac. 484 (1911) where
the notice was held to be sufficient although it had specified the site to be an excavation for curbing
but failed to say which side of the street. The court hints, however, that the notice might hove been
insufficient had there been an excavation on both sides of the street; City of Pueblo v. Babbitt, 47
Colo. 596, 108 Pac. 175 (1910) where the notice was held to be sufficient although it had mistakenly
said that the accident had been one block away from the true site, the court felt that the statute
provision pertaining to inaccuracies was controlling when it was shown that the plaintiff's attorney
had promptly notified the city attorney of thi error and that the city officials had then inspected the
true scene.
53 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code § 191.1 (1959).
54 City and County of Denver Charter art. VIII, I 158.
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with a defect or obstacle on a sidewalk or street.55 It is no longer a
question in Colorado as to what the respective duties of the municipality and its citizens are with respect to the streets and sidewalks.
City of Boulder v. Niles56 has often been cited for the following
proposition:
It may be said, generally, that the duty imposed upon
municipal corporations in respect to its [sic] sidewalks is
a duty to keep them in a reasonably safe condition. Upon
persons using the sidewalks the duty imposed is that of ordinary care. Under conditions of increased danger, there
is imposed a duty of increased care. These are general
principles to be understood and applied in the light of the
circumstances of each particular case. 57
The same doctrine has been applied to streets as well. 58 The city,
however, is not an insurer and is required only to keep its streets5 9
and sidewalks6 ° in a reasonably safe condition. Once a defect has
been brought to the attention of the city, it is its duty to repair the
defect within a reasonable time. The duty is applicable to defects in
upon
streets 61 as well as sidewalks. 62 This duty of repair is placed
63
the city and cannot be avoided, suspended, or delegated.
Three basic issues may arise in any case involving a defective
thoroughfare. These are: (1) the question of whether the city knew,
or should have known, of the existence of the defect; (2) whether
the defect complained of was one sufficiently hazardous to properly
subject the city to liability; and (3) the correlative duties and re55 Of the 149 Colorado cases noted herein, 32 involved defective streets, and 67 involved defective
sidewalks.
569 Colo. 415, 12 Pac. 632 (1886).
57 Id. at 419, 12 Poc. at 634. Accord, Griffith v. City and County of Denver, 55 Colo. 37, 132
Pac. 57 (1913); City of Denver v. Williams, 12 Colo. 475, 21 Pac. 617 (1889). See also City of Colorado
Springs v. May, 20 Colo. App. 204, 77 Pac. 1093 (1904) (city employees must use reasonable care).
58 City of Pueblo v. Smith, 57 Colo. 500, 143 Pac. 281 (1914). Accord, Pueblo v. Mace, 132 Colo.
89, 284 P.2d 596 (1955); City and County of Denver v. St. James Touring Car & Taxicab Co., 68 Colo.
203, 188 Pac. 734 (1920); Koch v. City and County of Denver, 24 Colo. App. 406, 133 Pac. 1119 (1913);
City of Denver v. Baldasari, 15 Colo. App. 157, 61 Pac. 190 (1900); City of Pueblo v. Smith, 3 Colo.
App. 386, 33 Pac. 685 (1893).
59 E.g., City of Pueblo v. Smith, 57 Colo. 500, 143 Poc. 281 (1914); City of Denver v. Moewes, 15
Colo. App. 28, 60 Pac. 986 (1900). See also Kling v. City and County of Denver, 335 P.2d 876 (Colo.
1959) where the city was not held liable for a street defect which allegedly caused the breaking of
the steering mechanism of the plaintiff's twenty year-old car.
60 E.g., Beck v. City and County of Denver, 95 Colo. 46, 32 P.2d 261 (1934); Garbanati v. City of
Durango, 30 Colo. 358, 70 Pac. 686 (1902); City of Denver v. Hyatt, 28 Colo. 129, 63 Poc. 403 (1900).
By inference should be added Johnson v. City and County of Denver, 135 Colo. 365, 311 P.2d 708
(1957) (judgment for city but no facts given about accident).
61 E.g., City of Denver v. Moewes, 15 Colo. App. 28, 60 Pac. 986 (1900) (nat required to repair
promptly).
62 E.g., Elliott v. Field, 21 Colo. 378, 41 Pac. 504 (1895); City of Boulder v. Weger, 17 Colo. App.
69, 66 Pac. 1070 (1902).
63 City of Denver v. Aaron, 6 Colo. App. 232, 40 Pac. 587 (1895).
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sponsibilities of the city, of abutting property owners, and of the
person injured by the defect. Omitting the questions of compliance
with the regulatory notice requirements previously discussed, it
may be said that in general, suits involving defective thoroughfares
are fought on battle lines drawn around any or all of these three
issues.
The issue of whether the municipality knew, or should have
known, of the defect which is the subject of litigation has confronted the courts many times. It is a basic tenet in Colorado that the
plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant-city had either
actual or constructive notice of the existence of the alleged defect.
This requirement of actual or constructive notice is noted in City
and County of Denver v. Magivney,6 4 where it was said:
When a defect in the sidewalk causing accident and injury was the result of the city's own negligent act, a
primary liability against the city attaches therefrom. But,
when such defective condition of the sidewalk results from
the negligent act of another, no liability attaches against
the municipality in the first instance. In order to hold the
city responsible in damages for injuries suffered thereby,
plaintiff must prove that the city had actual or constructive
notice of the defective condition for a sufficient length
of
65
time before the accident to have cured the defect.
The question of notice must be carefully analysed. It appears
that the problem of notice of defects in city-owned thoroughfares is
divided into notice of those defects caused by others than the city,
and notice of those defects not so caused. The above quotation from
Magivney must be considered to require actual or constructive notice of the defect by the city in any event. This is borne out by all
decisions concerning the question, particularly those holding that a
city is not an insurer.66 Where a defect not created by others is
shown to have existed for a reasonable period in a city thoroughfare,
and it is one which could have been detected by the reasonable
diligence of the municipality, it is presumed to have constructive
notice of that defect.6 7 It has also been expressed that notice or
knowledge of an obvious hazard is itself negligence per se.68
It is equally well established that constructive notice will be
imputed to the city where by the exercise of ordinary care, the city
should have anticipated defects which are to be normally expected
under the circumstances.6 9 Constructive knowledge will also be
64 44 Colo.

157, 96 Poc. 1002 (1908).

65 Id. at 161, 96 Pac. at 1004. Accord, Wold v. City of Boulder, 91 Colo. 44, 9 P.2d 931 (1932);
City of La Junta v. Burns, 46 Colo. 436, 104 Poc. 941 (1909) (notice of defect must be alleaed and set
forth in complaint); City of Denv-r v. Williams, 12 Colo. 475, 21 Pac. 617 (1889); City of Denver v.
Dean, 10 Colo. 375, 16 Pac. 30 (1887) (leading case). Compare City and County of Denver v. Farmer,
125 Colo. 462, 244 P.2d 1086 (1952) discussed in text at note 109 infra.
66 Cases cited in notes 59 and 60 supro. Accord, Cunningham v. City of Denver, 23 Colo. 18, 45
Pc. 356 (1896).
67 City of Denver v. Hyatt, 28 Colo. 129, 63 Pac. 403 (1900) (large hole in board wclk). Cf., City
of Fort Collins v. Roten, 72 Colo. 182, 210 Pac. 326 (1922) (defective slide in city park).
68 City of Pueblo v. Smith, 3 Colo. App. 386, 33 Pac. 685 (1893) (post protruding 27.inches above
surface of street). Compare Thunborg v. City of Pueblo, 45 Colo. 337, 101 Pac. 399 (1909), affirming
18 Colo. App. 80, 70 Pac. 148 (1902) (fire plug hidden in weeds alongside street). Other cases concerned with similar defects are: Pueblo v. Ratliff, 137 Colo. 468, 327 P.2d 270 (1958) where plaintiff
failed to establish constructive notice since a hole dug in the street by others was periodically refilled
as the dirt settled; Beck v. City and County of Denver, 95 Colo. 46, 32 P.2d 261 (1934) (facts did not
establish the alleged negligence per se of the city).
69 E.g., City of Sterling v. Ancioux, 112 Colo. 381, 149 P.2d 174 (1944) where the city was held to
have constructive notice of a hazord created by a city employee; City of Denver v. Dean, 10 Colo.
375, 16 Pac. 30 (1887).
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found where it is shown that the city has had the means of knowledg4 of such defects for a sufficient time to have corrected the defect. The "means of knowledge" principle, however, is limited to
those defects which are visible or which naturally arise from normal usage or natural climatic conditions. 0
The question of whether evidence is properly admissible to
show that the city should be charged with constructive or actual
notice sometimes becomes complicated. Generally-accepted rules of
evidence play as vital a part here as in any trial proceeding. It was
shown in the previous discussion of statutory notice that the plaintiff's notice to the municipality must accurately describe the location and nature of the alleged defect. 7 1 Obviously, testimony must
be introduced in the resulting trial in order to substantiate the
plaintiff's claim of the existence of the defect. It has been held that
evidence showing only that the board walks of the city were generally in a defective condition is not sufficient to establish the existence of the particular defect alleged; nor does it serve to charge
the municipality with notice of that defect.72 It, however, is permissible to establish notice to the municipality where it is shown that
defects similar to the one complained of were commonly found in
the immediate vicinity of the accident. 73 Similarly, testimony showing that municipal employees frequently worked in the immediate
74
area of the accident scene has been admitted as evidence of notice.
One of the most disputed points has been whether evidence of
previous accidents to others at the same location is admissible.75
One line of cases follows the reasoning that such evidence is inadmissible since the introduction of this evidence would present innumerable collateral issues. 7 6 Other cases have permitted evidence

of previous accidents where it is offered for the purpose of showing
that a dangerous situation existed and the city thereby had had
constructive notice. 77 It should be noted that in those cases permitting this testimony, one of the issues involved was whether the
municipality had had notice. In those cases rejecting this evidence,
the matter of notice was either not in issue or the city had admitted
having notice.
It is generally accepted that mere proof that a tort-feasor has
subsequently repaired a defect is inadmissible to pr6ve the negligence of the defendant.78 Introduction of such evidence, however,
has been permitted where the jury had viewed the scene of the accident.79 One case, involving an accident caused by the plaintiff's
70 City of Denver v. Dean, supro note 69. Accord, City and County of Denver v. Caton, 108 Col o .
170, 114 P.2d 553 (1941); City of Lo Junto v. Burns, 46 Colo. 436, 104 Pac. 941 (1909); City of Denver
v. Hyatt, 28 Colo. 129, 63 Pac. 403 (1900); City of Denver v. Williams, 12 Colo. 475, 21 Poc. 617
(1889).
71 See text at note 51 supro.
72 City of Boulder v. Weger, 17 Colo. App. 69, 66 Pac. 1070 (1902).
73 Town of Colorado City v. Smith, 17 Colo. App. 172, 67 Pac. 909 (1902).
74 City of Colorado Springs v. Oehschloger, 137 Colo. 147, 322 P.2d 108 (1958).
75 See generally 2 Wigmore, Evidence 1 252 (3d ed. 1940).
76 Griffith v. City and County of Denver, 55 Colo. 37, 132 Pac. 57 (1913) (extra-smooth sidewalk);
Diamond Rubber Co. v. Harrymon, 41 Colo. 415, 92 Pac. 922 (1907) (pipe protruding out of sidewalk)
in which the court distinguished City of Denver v. Hyatt, 28 Colo. 129, 63 Pac. 403 (1900) on the
grounds that the defect in Hyatt was plainly visible for such a period of time as to create o presumption of notice to the city. It should be noted that in Hyatt the evidence was only as to the absence of
a street light and was not concerned of all with previous accidents.
77 City and County of Denver v. Brubaker, 97 Colo. 501, 51 P.2d 352 (1935); Town of Meeker v.
Fairfield, 25 Colo. App. 187, 136 Pac. 471 (1913).
78 Griffith v. City and County of Denver, 55 Colo. 37, 132 Pac. 57 (1913); Diamond Rubber Co. v.
Harryman, 41 Colo. 415, 92 Pac. 922 (1907); Town of Meeker v. Fairfield, supra note 77; 2 Wigmore,
Evidence 1 283 (3d ed. 1940).
79 City of Fort Collins v. Roten, 72 Colo. 182, 210 Pac. 326 (1922).
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horse being frightened by a steam roller, permitted introduction of
evidence that other horses passing by had also been frightened by
the steam roller. 80 Evidence showing that an undedicated street was
widely used by the public and that the municipal authorities had
voluntarily assumed the maintenance of it was held to be prima
facie evidence that the street was in fact a public thoroughfare. 81
Evidence has also been admitted for the purpose8 2of showing the
surrounding conditions at the time of the accident.
Assuming that all other problems have been resolved, the defect itself must be examined. It is not every defect in a sidewalk 3
or a street 84 that is actionable. In Nelson v. City and County of Denver, 5 it was said:
A defect in a street or sidewalk, to be actionable, must
be such that a reasonably prudent person would anticipate
danger from its existence .... Sometimes this is a question
for the jury ... and sometimes the defect is such that, as a
matter of law, it is not actionable .... Each case must be

determined on the facts in evidence.8 6
Little difficulty has been had in determining that an unmarked
and unguarded excavation in a thoroughfare is actionable as a matter of course,8 7 even when they are to one side of the thoroughfare. 88
Excavations immediately adjacent to a thoroughfare also have been
found actionable since it may reasonably be expected that a user of
the thoroughfare might deviate a slight amount from the beaten
track.8 9 Obstructions, such as piles of sand in the street,90 posts protruding well out of the surface of the street, 91 or park benches on
the sidewalk, 92 are given much the same treatment by the courts.
The more common accidents, such as tripping over slight obstructions or small holes, are much more difficult to segregate into definite categories of liability or non-liability. Each set of circumstances must be analysed, and only general statements may be made
in this area.
These more common types of accidents have posed quite a problem in Colorado municipal liability suits. Much, if not all, of the
problem in this area has been created by the courts themselves in
attempting arbitrarily to set a fixed dimension for determining
whether a given unevenness is actionable as a matter of law.
0City

of Boulder -. Stewordson, 67 Colo. 582, 189 Pac. 1 (1920), reversing 26 Colo. App. 290, 143

Pac. 820 (1914).

81 Town of Salida v. McKinno, 16 Colo. 523, 27 Pac. 810 (1891).
82 City of Longmont v. Swearingen, 81 Colo. 246, 254 Pac. 1000 (1927) (coldness of water in swim-

ming pool); City of Denver v. Hyatt, 28 Colo. 129, 63 Pac. 403 (1900)

scene).

(absence of light at accident

S3 E.g., City of Denver v. Hyatt, supro note 82.
84 E.o., City of Denver v. Maoewes, 15 Colo. App. 28, 60 Pac. 986 (1900).

85 109 Colo. 113, 122 P.2d 252 (1942).
86 Id. at 118, 122 P.2d at 254.
87 Elliott v. Field, 21 Colo. 378, 41 Pac. 504 (1895). Compare City of Colorado City v. Hunt, 56
Colo. 336, 138 Poc. 24 (1914) whEre plaintiff was found guilty of contributory negligence in assuming
the risk of jumping an excavation.
88 City of Fort Collins v. Yetter, 38 Colo. 87, 89 Pac. 777 (1906). Accord, Restatement, Torts I 368
(1934). Compare Town of Lyons v. Watt, 43 Colo. 238, 95 Pac. 949 (1908).
89 City of Boulder v. Burns, 135 Colo. 561, 313 P.2d 712 (1957); City of Denver v. Hamilton, 8 Colo.
App. 392, 46 Pac. 1115 (1896); City of Denver v. Johnson, 8 Colo. App. 384, 46 Pac. 621 (1896); City
of Denver v. Solomon, 2 Colo. App. 534, 31 Pac. 507 (1892). Accord, Restatement, Torts § 368 (1934).
Compcre Town of Lyons v. Watt, supra note 88.
90 Arps v. City and County of Denver, 82 Colo. 189, 257 Pac. 1094 (1927). Accord, City of Denver
v. Murray, 18 Colo. App. 142, 70 Pac. 440 (1902) (wooden derrick in street).
91 City of Pueblo v. Smith, 3 Colo. App. 386, 53 Pac. 685 (1893). Compare Thunborg v. City of
Pueblo, 45 Colo. 337, 101 Pac. 399 (1909), affirming 18 Colo. App. 80, 70 Pac. 148 (1902).
92 Higgins v. City of Boulder, 105 Cola. 395, 98 P.2d 996 (1940). Accord, City and County of Denver
v. Austria, 136 Colo. 454, 318 P.2d 1103 (1957) (fence across steps of city hall).
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The move toward fixing an arbitrary dimension, which in itself
would determine whether a given defect was3 actionable as a matter of law, apparently began in an early case involving a hole, perhaps two to three inches deep, in the top layer of planking on a viaduct. The plaintiff was successful in recovering for damages incurred when his horse stepped into this hole. The court voiced the
opinion that allowing such a defect to remain unrepaired was not
reasonable performance of the city's duty to keep its streets in a
usable condition. Several years later, the court reversed, with directions to dismiss, a case 94 involving an unevenness of only onefourth to three-fourths of an inch in the planks of a viaduct. The
court felt that much a trivial defect did not show unreasonable performance of the city's responsibilities. These decisions were followed in City and Conuty of Denver v. Hatter,9" which set the stage
93 City of Denver v. Boldosori, 15 Colo. App. 157, 61 Poc. 190 (1900).
94 City of Pueblo v. Smith, 57 Colo. 500, 143 Poc. 281 (1914).
95 68 Colo. 194, 188 Pac. 728 (1920).
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by affirming judgment for the plaintiff who had tripped over a sidewalk flagstone which was approximately 11/4 inches to 2 -inches
higher than the ground in front of it. The court readily distinguished Hatter from Smith by saying that in Smith the defect complained of had been one-fourth to three-fourths of an inch high;
whereas in Hatter, not only was the defect much more pronounced,
but also it was in a pedestrian walkway.
More fuel for the fire was added a short time after Hatter.
Judgment for the plaintiff was reversed with directions to dismiss
in a similar case96 when it was shown that the protrusion had been
only 1%-inches high. The court distinguished the case with Hatter
on the basis of the difference in height of the protrusions; and then
cited two cases 97 from other jurisdictions holding that an inequality
of two inches or less was not, as a matter of law, an actionable defect. A second case 98 immediately followed the Burrows case in
which the alleged defect had been "perhaps two inches." In reversing, the court cited Burrows. The die was now cast. Colorado had
decreed that a defect of less than "perhaps two inches" was not sufficient alone, as a matter of law, to charge a municipality with negligence. Burrows was cited again in a case 99 where the plaintiff
had tripped over some nails protruding only three-fourths of an
inch from a board walk.
Signs that the court might weaken in this matter of dimensional
analysis first appeared in Nelson v. City and County of Denver.100
The plaintiff's notice to the city had stated that his fall upon a city
sidewalk had been caused by an uplifted slab raised "approximately
two inches" above the adjacent slab. The formal complaint, among
other things, alleged that the defective slab was raised three inches.
The trial court granted a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
complaint did not agree with the plaintiff's written notice. The supreme court, by a 4-3 decision, reversed the dismissal and remanded the cause for new trial. Speaking of the Burrows case, the court
said: "True, in that case we said: 'An inequality of two inches or
less had been held, as a matter of law, not to render it not reasonably safe for public travel.'"'o But, the court continued,
We did not hold ...

that we would follow cases further

than as to an inequality of one and three-eights inches.
Furthermore, in that case we were speaking in the light of
the evidence as to all the facts and circumstances of the
case. . . . The general and, as we think, the controlling,
principle in such cases is . . . "Mere irregularity and in-

equality of the surface of a way does not of itself make a
city liable for damages sustained at such a place."... Sometimes this is a question for the jury . . . and sometimes the

defect is such that as a matter of law, it is not actionable .... 102
96 City and County of Denver v. Burrows, 76 Colo. 17, 227 Pac. 840 (1924).
97 Northrup v. City of Pontiac, 159 Mich. 250, 123 N.W. 1107 (1909) (grating projected two inches
above sidewalk); Beltz v. City of Yonkers, 148 N.Y. 67, 42 N.E. 401 (1895) (21/2-inch gap between
flagstones in sidewalk).
98 City of Colorado Springs v. Phillips, 76 Colo. 257, 230 Pac. 617 (1924) (plaintiff died shortly
afterwards as a result).
99 Beck v. City and County of Denver, 95 Colo. 46, 32 P.2d 261 (1934).
100 109 Colo. 113, 122 P.2d 252 (1942).
101 Id. at 117, 122 P.2d at 254.
.02 Id. at 118, 122 P.2d at 254.
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The court, before discussing how incongruous it was to apply the
same rule to defects in front of a home for the aged and to those in
the warehouse district, laid the foundation by saying:
With the principle thus announced in mind, we think
it an unreasonable construction of the opinion [Burrows]
to say that it lays down the proposition that, whether permitting an inequality or raised block in a sidewalk, constitutes actionable
negligence may be determined simply
10 °
with a foot rule.
The case is not authority for such a proposition. 10 4 Parker v.
City and County of Denver'0 5 completely squelched the earlier cases
relying upon a fixed dimension. With a fine touch of veiled humor,
the court, in discussing the difference of five-eighths of an inch in
Burrows and Phillips, said that if five-eights of an inch had made
no difference, there would be no reason why the next case involving
a protrusion of only five-eights of an inch higher would not also be
held not actionable as a matter of law. The court felt that a continued progressive raising of the standard would finally result in
holding that there was no such thing as an actionable defect. The
court, in overruling Burrows and Phillips, established a more practical rule by saying:
[T] he extent of the depression or elevation in a street
which will relieve the city of actionable negligence in its
maintenance must vary with other circumstances ....
The
other circumstances which must be taken into consideration
in all of these cases is the amount of travel on the sidewalk,
the location of the depression or elevation, the nature of the
area, and other circumstances which may properly be considered by a jury in the determination of the case.' 06
Mr. Justice Holland, the lone dissenter, felt that the cities needed
the preservation of the Burrows rule for security in being able to
determine what was an actionable defect. Abandoning the previous
rule, he felt, would result in the cities being placed in the position
of being an insurer of all persons using the streets and sidewalks.
In the light of the "sidewalk" cases just discussed, it is somewhat puzzling to compare those cases with the cases involving a
fall into a manhole with a defective cover.10 7
Three cases, all within the last eight years, involving somewhat
similar circumstances have presented an apparent conflict between
two of these and with the sidewalk cases as well. In City of Boulder
v. Burns1 8 the plaintiff was injured when she stepped onto a defective meter pit cover which tipped and dropped her into the pit. Although the pit was outside of the city limits, the city had installed
and maintained it for the purpose of supplying water to rural users.
At the scene of the accident there were no sidewalks, but the pit
was located along the roadside where pedestrians habitually walked.
The court held that although the city had no duty to maintain a safe
103 Ibid.
104 Id. at 118-19, 122 P.2d at 254.
105 128 Colo. 355, 262 P.2d 553 (1953).
106 Id. at 360, 262 P.2d at 555. Accord, City of Colorado Springs v. Oehschlager, 137 Colo. 147,
322 P.2d 108 (1958) (there is usually a "shadow zone").
107 The earliest case involving such an accident was City of Denver v. Dean, 10 Colo. 375, 16 Pac.
30 (1887). Dean should be compared with Peek v. City of Lamar, 87 Colo. 87, 285 Pac. 168 (1930) and
City and County of Denver v. Magivney, 44 Colo. 157, 36 Pac. 1002 (1908).
1t' 135 Colo. 561, 313 P.2d 712 (1957).

MAY-JUNE

1960

DICTA

walkway outside of the city limits, the ciy was negligent for placing
a dangerous pitfall in a public passageway.
City and County of Denver v. Farmer'019 involved an injury suffered by an elderly man when, in walking a few feet from a regularly-used bus stop to the nearby sidewalk, he stepped on a faulty
manhole cover in the city-maintained parkway between the curb
and walk. As in Burns, the cover tipped, and the elderly gentleman
broke his leg in the resulting fall into the manhole. The court, in
reversing judgment for the plaintiff with directions to dismiss, said
that despite the fact the parkway was technically part of the street,
it was not to be considered a part of the sidewalk to be maintained
in safe condition for pedestrians.
[T] herefore, the degree of care relative to the so-called
park area is of a lower standard than that required in the
construction and maintenance of the streets and sidewalks
proper. The duty resting on the city looks toward the safety of those who are expected to use the streets and sidewalks, and that degree of safety does not extend to a parkway which is not expected to be used by pedestrians. The
pedestrian has no right to expect the ordinary area between
the sidewalks and the curb stone to be in as safe condition
as the sidewalk, and to place any such burden on the city
is unreasonable. 110
The court then cited dictum from an earlier case"' for the proposition that a pedestrian has no right to assume that the way from the
sidewalk to the street was smooth. Of special interest are the words
12
used in Burns as it distinguished that case from Farmer.In Burns, 2
the court, in speaking of Farmer, said that there the plaintiff in
"avoiding" the sidewalk was a trespasser on the parkway, and there
anyone to keep the parkway in a safe
was no duty on the part 11of
3
condition for pedestrians.
This amazing statement designating one walking on a parkway
as a trespasser is even more startling when compared with City and
County of Denver v. Stutzman.14 In Stutzman the court specifically
approved an instruction given to the trial jury that people have the
right to go onto public property without invitation; and that although
the city has no obligation to keep that property safe for everyone,
the city is liable if it negligently constructs and maintains a dangerous condition which cannot be seen unless the city has warned those
109 125 Colo. 462, 244 P.2d 1086 (1952).
110 Id. at 465-66, 244 P.2d at 1088. This statement should be compared with the language in City
and County of Denver v. Forster, 89 Colo. 246, 1 P.2d 922 (1931) (plaintiff tripped over safety zone
marker) and in City of Colorado Springs v. Floyd, 19 Colo. App. 167, 73 P.2d 1092 (1903) where a
leaky fire plug had created an ice hazard in the street between a street car stop and the street.
Contra, Restatement, Torts § 367 (1934).
111 Oliver v. City of Denver, 13 Colo. App. 345, 57 Pac. 729 (1899) where the plaintiff tripped over
a railing adjacent to the sidewalk and sued the city for its negligence in failing to provide street lights
and in permitting the railing to be installed.
112 City of Boulder v. Burns, 135 Cola. 561, 566, 313 P.2d 712, 715 (1957).
113 Contra, City of Denver v. Stein, 25 Colo. 125, 53 Pac. 283 (1898) where the city was held liable
for placing a small pipe protruding three inches from the ground between the curb and the sidewalk;
Restatement, Torts 1 335 (1934).
114 95 Colo. 165, 33 P.2d 1071 (1934) where the plaintiff's daughter drowned while wading in cityowned river.
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who habitually use that property. Unfortunately Stutzman apparently was not considered by the court in Farmer.
Aikens v. George W. Clayton Trust Comm'n1n 5 briefly reaffirmed Farmer when Mr. Justice Holland said, "The hole being in
the parkway, which is not designed for pedestrian use, the matter
of the city's liability in such instances is settled ....1,6 This is the
apparent
position currently in effect in Colorado.
The "icy

sidewalk" cases are little different in most respects
from the "sidewalk" cases already discussed. Most of the previouslydiscussed principles, e.g., statutory notice, actual or constructive notice, are equally applicable. Questions pertaining to the responsibilities and duties of the municipality, of abutting property owners,
and of pedestrians are applicable to all thoroughfare cases. Many
of the "icy sidewalk" cases, however, point out these multiple collateral duties with more definiteness than in the usual "sidewalk"

cases.
Referring again to the previously-given quotation 1

7

from Ma-

givney, n8 it is well established that the city is primarily liable for
hazards created by its own negligence or by natural causes;11 9 but
when a hazard is created by an artificial cause, 120 the city, as well
as the abutting property owner responsibile for the artificial hazard,
are jointly liable."' The municipality must, however, be shown to
have had actual or constructive notice of the hazard for a sufficient
period to have corrected the hazard. 122 The municipality's duty is

115 132 Colo. 374, 288 P.2d 349 (1955).
116 Id. at 377, 288 P.2d at 351.
117 See text at note 65 supro.
11 C'ty and County of Denver v. Magivney, 44 Cola. 157, 161, 96 Pac. 1002, 1004 (1908).
119 Beezley v. Olsan, 129 Colo. 406, 270 P.2d 758 (1954) where the court said that the presence of
snow or ice on a sidewalk was not actionable unless it had sufficiently accumulated so as to cause
one to fall and that the accumulation hord existed long enough for the city to have had constructive
notice; W. T. Grant Co. v. Cosady, 117 Colo. 405, 188 P.2d 881 (1948); City and County of Denver v.
Coton, 108 Colo. 170, 114 P.2d 553 (1941) (one justice dissenting) where the court said a city was not
to be held as strictly for such accumulations in a cross walk as for those an a sidewalk; City of
Alamosa v. Johnson, 99 Colo. 134, 60 P.2d 1087 (1936) (must be an accumulation).
120 City of Grand Junction v. Eichelberger, 138 Colo. 479, 334 P.2d 1095 (1959) where melting snow
from a sloping driveway ran onto a depressed sidewalk and refroze each night; Wold v. City of
Boulder, 91 Colo. "4, 9 P.2d 931 (1932) where the city was given judgment when the paintiff failed
to show that the hazard was a recurring one; City and County of Denver v. Willson, 81 Colo. 134,
254 Pac. 153 (1927) where water draining onto sidewalk from a downspout was held to be an effective artificial cause.
121 See text at note 126 infra.
122 E.g., Beezley v. Olson, 129 Colo. 406, 270 P.2d 758 (1954) (dictum); City and County of Denver
v. Dugdale, 127 Colo. 329, 256 P.2d 898 (1953) (two justices dissenting) (two days not sufficient
time); City of Sterling v. Ancioux, 112 Colo. 381, 149 P.2d 174 (1944) where city was held liable
despite elapse of only a few hours where it was shown that the city's street washer was responsible;
City and County of Denver v. Caton, 108 Colo. 170, 114 P.2d 553 (1941) (one justice dissenting) (judgment for plaintiff despite possibility that only two days had elapsed); City of Boulder v. Niles, 9
Colo. 415, 12 Pac. 632 (1886) (question of fact as to whether five days sufficient); City of Denver v.
Solomon, 2 Colo. App. 534, 31 Pac. 507 (1892).
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not changed despite the fact that the U.S. Government owned the
abutting property and had constructed the sidewalk,1 2' 3 or that the
abutting property was a vacant lot.'2

4

The pedestrian himself must

have used increased care under conditions of increased hazard. 25
The duty of abutting property owners is well phrased in City
of Denver v. Utzler 2 where it was said:
It is the duty of a city to maintain its streets and highways in a reasonably good condition for ordinary travel by
persons using due care and prudence in the use of the same.
Citizens owning property bordering upon the street have
not the right to place obstructions upon such portions of
the street as are intended to be used as a travelway, and the
city has no right to suffer this to be done. Where it is permitted, and one lawfully upon the street and using due care,
is injured because of such obstruction, and without fault
upon his part, the city is liable. The city is not liable, however, except in cases where an obstruction is the proximate
cause of the injury, and it is not liable if the party injured
could have avoided the injury by127the exercise of reasonable
and ordinary care and prudence.
It should be noted that liability is imputed to the abutting owner only for obstructions and artificial causes for which he is responsible. 2 1 At common law the owner of property abutting sidewalks
owes no duty to keep the walk free of ice and snow accumulating
from natural causes.'2 9 Civil liability is not imposed upon the property owner for failure to remove snow even where the municipality
has a penal ordinance requiring property owners to promptly remove it from the abutting walks. 30 Failure of the owner to promptly remove the snow or ice does not, however, give the city the right
to wait to determine if the owner is going to remove the ice as required."'
Other cases involving miscellaneous thoroughfare accidents
have held that the municipality is not liable for accidents to a spec123 City of Denver v. Human, 9 Colo. App. 144, 47 Pac. 911 (1897); City of Denver v. Hickey, 9
Colo. App. 137, 47 Pac. 908 (1897).
124 City of Denver v. Rhodes, 24 Colo. App. 114, 131 Pac. 786 (1913).
125 E.g., City of Denver v. Hubbard, 29 Colo. 529, 69 Pac. 508 (1902). A minor question is often
raised in "icy sidewalk" cases as to whether the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence for
choosing the route where the accident occurred rather than a safer route. The usual result is that
when the icy condition is generally wide-spread, with little difference in the alternate routes, the
plaintiff is not charged at low with contributory negligence. Typical views on this point are found in
City and County of Denver v. Hudson, 91 Colo. 87, 12 P.2d 344 (1932) (icy sidewalk). City of Highlands v. Raine, 23 Colo. 295, 47 Pac. 283 (1896) (judgment for plaintiff) involved an accident on an
icy sidewalk with one long section tipped steeply to one side. When it is considered that the plaintiff
could have easily detoured around this extro-hazardous section, it is difficult to distinguish this case
from City of Colorado Springs v. Phillips, 76 Colo. 257, 230 Pac. 617 (1924) (judgment for plaintiff
reversed). In Phillips, the court said it was the duty of the plaintiff's decedent to detour around a
known hazard. See generally Restatement, Torts 11 473-74 (1934); Prosser, Torts 288-89 (2d ed. 1955).
For typical views of the court on contributory negligence, see City of Victor v. Carbis, 59 Colo.
92, 147 Pac. 331 (1915) where the plaintiff was injured while running across slick steel door imbedded
in sidewalk; City of Colorado City v. Hunt, 56 Cola. 336, 138 Pac. 24 (1914) where plaintiff deliberately attempted to leap across an excavation which she could have easily avoided by choosing an
alternate route.
126 38 Colo. 300, 88 Pac. 143 (1906).
127 Id. at 303-04, 88 Pac. at 144-45. Accord, Goede v. City of Colorado Springs, 200 Fed. 99 (D.
Colo. 1912). See generally Prosser, Torts 428-29 (2d ed. 1955).
128 Cases cited in note 120 supra. Accord, Sill v. Lewis. 344 P.2d 972 (Colo. 1959) (city not a
party); City of Denver v. Murray, 18 Colo. App. 142, 70 Pac. 440 (1902) (obstruction in street);
Restatement, Torts § 368, comment e (1934). See generally Prosser, Torts 430 (2d ed. 1955).
129 Goede v. City of Colorado Springs, 200 Fed. 99 (D. Colo. 1912); Beezley v. Olson, 129 Colo.
406, 270 P.2d 758 (1954); Swenson v. La Shell, 118 Colo. 333, 195 P.2d 385 (1948); W. T. Grant Co.
v. Casady, 117 Colo. 405, 188 P.2d 881 (1948). Accord, Restatement, Torts 9 363 (1934).
130 Beezley v. Olson, supra note 129; W. T. Grant Co. v. Cosady, supro note 129.
131 City and County of Denver v. Brubaker, 97 Colo. 501, 51 P.2d 352 (1935).
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tator viewing an illegal exhibition on a city street; 132 nor is it liable
when a child playing around a street-side evacuation is burned by a
warning flare-pot. 13 3 One case held that it is the city's duty to keep
and maintain all of a sidewalk, and that the public has the right to
134
The
expect that the entire walk is reasonably safe 1for
35 travel.
streets.
to
also
applied
been
have
principles
same
NEGLIGENCE IN MINISTERIAL FUNCTIONS

Damages to citizens caused by flood waters or in the city's
failure either to provide or to adequately size sewer systems have
initiated several Colorado cases. As mentioned earlier, the municipality is not liable for its failure or refusal to engage in a ministerial
one of these
function; it is only when the city has embarked into
functions that it becomes bound for its negligence. 136 Thus it has
been held that:
[A] municipality is under no legal duty to construct
drainage sewers; that no liabiliy attaches because of the
adoption of a defective plan of drainage because it is thereby exercising a governmental function; but that, in the construction and maintenance of sewers, a municipality acts in
and is liable for negligence in conits ministerial capacity
137
nection therewith.
The distinction must be drawn between non-liability for adoption of a defective plan and liability for construction of a defective
sewer line. Where the general scheme in its entirety is inadequate
or incorrectly designed, the city is acting in its governmental capacity and as such is immune. It is when, and only when, the city
is negligent in the performance of the actual construction or maintenance of the sewer itself-whether it is adequate or not-that
liability attaches. This is a fine distinction, but it does exist nevertheless. This distinction is well illustrated in those cases 138 dealing
with flooding from defective sewers.
A few cases were found involving flooding of the plaintiff's
property because of improper provisions taken by third parties using city streets and acting under a license from the municipality.
City of Denver v. Bayer,139 although not an action for tort, has been
the keystone case for those third-party cases which did sound in
tort. The court in the Bayer case said:
[W]e think that for injuries caused by a reasonable
change or improvement of the street by the council, in14a0
careful manner, the abutting owner should not recover.
132 Noble v. City of Canon City, 73 Colo. 374, 215 Pac. 867 (1923).
133 City of Grand Junction v. Lashmett, 126 Colo. 256, 247 P.2d 909 (1952).
134 City of Denver v. Stein, 25 Colo. 125, 53 Pac. 283 (1898). No defense that there was ample
room for pedestrians to travel along the safe portion.
135 Arps v. City and County of Denver, 82 Colo. 189, 257 Pac. 1094 (1927); City of Pueblo v
Smith, 3 Colo. App. 386, 33 Pac. 685 (1893). Compare Thunborg v. City of Pueblo, 45 Colo. 337, 101
Pac. 399 (1909), affirming 18 Colo. App. 80, 70 Pac. 148 (1902).
136 See text at note 24 supra.
137 City and County of Denver v. Mason, 88 Colo. 294, 295, 295 Pac. 788, 789 (1931). Cf., Malvernia
Inv. Co. v. City of Trinidad, 123 Colo. 394, 229 P.2d 945 (1951) (not bound to keep water off belowgrade lots); City of Boulder v. Fowler, 11 Colo. 396, 18 Pac. 337 (1888) (below-grade lot); City of
Denver v. Copelfi, 4 Colo. 25 (1877) (dictum); Daniels v. City of Denver, 2 Colo. 669 (1875) (belowgrade lot); Aicher v. City of Denver, 10 Colo. App. 413, 52 Pac. 86 (1897).
138 City and County of Denver v. Mason, supra note 137; City of Denver v. Rhodes, 9 Colo. 554,
13 Pac. 729 (1886) (city bound to keep sewers up to original capacity); City of Denver v. Capelli,
supra note 137 (dictum) (citizens have right to expect that sewers will remain open).
139 7 Colo. 113, 2 Pac. 6 (1883). Plaintiff was suing city for damages to his rights of entry to his
property caused when a railroad was granted an easement along a street by the city.
140 Id. ot 125, 2 Pac. at 13.
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and, the court further said:
If the railroad company disobey the law in building or
operating its road, the city is no more responsible therefor
than it would be for a tort of the private individual .... 141
These quotations from Bayer effectively summarize the position taken by Colorado and have been cited for this principle in
those cases 142 involving such an issue.

Cardiff Light & Water Co. v. Taylor 143 was an action against the
water company and City of Glenwood Springs for damages incurred
by the plaintiff from a leaking water main belonging to both defendants. The city owned the local water system and also furnished
water to its co-defendant for resale in a nearby town. The city was
held liable despite its contention that the contract with the water
company was ultra vires.14 4 The obvious distinction between this
case and those discussed immediately above is that here the city was
a party to the negligence.
141 Id. at 127, 2 Pac. at 14.
142 Luxford v. City and County of Denver, 65 Colo. 355, 176 Pac. 833 (1918) where a railroad embankment across the end of the street for thirty years diverted flood waters onto the'plaintiff's land
for the first time; Sorensen v. Town of Greeley, 10 Colo. 369, 15 Pac. 803 (1887) where the building

of a railroad embankment across a street made

it necessary for the plaintiff to go to considerable

expense to replace his irrigation water supply ditch; Town of Idaho Springs v. Filteau, 10 Colo. 105,
14 Pac. 48 (1887) (plaintiff's property damaged by leaking of mining company's flume in street);

Town of Idaho Springs v. Woodward, 10 Colo. 104, 14 Pac. 49 (1887) (same facts as Filteau).
14373 Colo. 566, 216 Pac. 711 (1923).
144 Ultra vires has been raised as a defense in a few other cases. Mill v. City of Fort Collins, 106
Cola. 229, 104 P.2d 143 (1940) (dictum) whore the court said that even if a contract was ultra vires,

if the city had received a benefit from it, the city would be estopped from pleading ultra vires as a
defense; Town of Idaho Springs v. Filteau, 10 Colo. 105, 14 Pac. 48 (1887) (not liable for negligence
of other party to ultra vires contract with city); Town of Idaho Springs v. Woodward, 10 Colo. 104,
14 Pac. 49 (1887) (same as Filteau).
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Flood control projects engaged in by a municipality have resulted in what appears at first glance to be inconsistent results.
These cases can be distinguished however by careful analysis of the
precise questions presented upon appeal. Three cases dealing with
separate injuries to adjacent land owners by the same flood ended
in completely opposite results although the same fact situation was
involved in all three cases. The three plaintiffs owned separate
farming tracts just outside the corporate limits of Denver. These
tracts, all below the historical high-water mark of the Platte river,
were inundated by flood waters which rolled through a break in the
river dike protecting their property. The break in the dike had been
purposely left over a weekend by city employees engaged in replacing a sewer drain through the city-owned dike. The flash flood
struck a few hours after the city employees quit work, and apparently without advance warning.
The first of these cases 145 ended in victory for the plaintiff who
had charged the city with negligence in the maintenance of the dike.
The second case146 resulted in victory for the city. The defense
raised by the city in the second case was that it had no duty to the
out-of-city plaintiff other than to refrain from increasing the hazard
of flooding to the plaintiff's land. The city argued that prior to the
erection of the dike, the plaintiff's land was subject to natural flooding; and that the break in the dike had not increased the flood hazard any more than if the dike had not been in existence. The court
agreed, and said that the city's duty was only to its inhabitants and
that the plaintiff had no right to rely upon the protection of the
municipally-owned dike. The court, in distinguishing the instant
case from the earlier parallel action, said that the previous case was
conducted upon the sole issue of negligence, whereas the instant
case was conducted solely upon the question of duty. "Whether
the contention made here might have been urged in the former case
•..and, if so, what our decisions might have been ...we need not
now determine. ' 147 The third case 1 48 went exactly as had the second
since it, too, was founded upon149the same defense.
150
McCord v. City of Pueblo and Stewart v. City of Pueblo
were parallel cases upon similar fact situations. In these cases, both
parties were inhabitants of Pueblo and it was shown that their
property was above the flood level of the Arkansas river. The city
had constructed levees upon both sides of the river brut had purposely left a large gap through one of these levees. Judgments of
dismissal were reversed in favor of both plaintiffs in their suits for
damages to their properties from flood waters entering through the
wide gap.
In another case, 151 previously mentioned, 152 the plaintiff's teenage daughter was drowned while wading in a knee-deep section of
the Platte river owned by the City and County of Denver. The girl
had drowned when she stepped into an unmarked underwater ex145 City and County of Denver v. Tolorico, 99 Colo. 178, 61 P.2d 1 (1936).
146 City and County of Denver v. Pilo,102 Colo. 326, 79 P.2d 270 (1938).
147 Id. at 335-36, 79 P.2d at 274.
148 City and County of Denver v. Strafacia, 110 Colo. 14, 129 P.2d 674 (1942).
1495 Colo. App. 48, 36 Pac. 1109 (1894).
1505 Colo. App. 55, 36 Pac. 1111 (1894). See also, City and County of Denver v. Merchant's Biscuit
Co., 61 Colo. 238, 157 Pac. 842 (1916) (Act of God is valid defense).
151 City and County of Denver v. Stutman, 95 Colo. 165, 33 P.2d 1071 (1934).
152 See text at note 114 supra.
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cavation which the city had dredged in the river bottom for flood
control purposes. The city was held liable for its negligence in not
warning those who used the public property of the unmarked
hazard.
When the city establishes and maintains an area for dumping
waste materials, it is considered to be a corporate duty. The city
will therefore be liable for its negligence when a fire on such a
dump destroys private property adjacent to the dump.' 3 The city,
however, will not be liable for being unable to enforce a prohibition
against 154
private citizens using privately-owned land for a dumping
ground.
It would have been of great interest to have compared cases
involving falls into unguarded but hidden pitfalls in city parks with
the cases previously discussed 55 involving falls into such hazards
in parkways. Unfortunately no case was uncovered dealing with
the former fact situation. Other cases, however, were found involving accidents in city parks. In general, it may be said that a city is
liable for its negligence in maintaining 15 6 or erecting 1' 7 equipment
in a public park. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed in a case
where the plaintiff's son had drowned in a city-operated swimming
pool where it was shown that the city's life guard had been absent
with the knowledge of the pool's manager. 158 The court felt that the
absence of the life guard was the proximate cause of the unfortunate accident.
CITY EMPLOYEES PERFORMING THEIR DUTIES IN

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ACTIVITIES
Many of the cases discussed so far have obviously involved the

negligence of an employee of a city. Most of these cases, however,
have resulted from an employee's negligent performance of a function which is clearly private or corporate. As may be expected,
where an attempt is made to establish a well-divided line between
those activities of a municipality which are immune from tort liability and those which are not, an area in which there is much uncertainty has sprung up. This uncertainty has been pointed out in
several cases. In City and County of Denver v. Forster,"9 the plaintiff sought to recover for injuries received when he tripped over a
safety-zone marker imbedded in the street. The court, in reversing
the plaintiff's favorable verdict, said:
[TI he judgment is wrong, for in granting such powers
and authorizing such devices the defendant was acting in
its governmental rather than in its administrative capacity.
The construction and maintenance of the streets of a mun153 City of Denvor v. Dvis, 37 Colo. 370, 86 Pac. 1027 (1906). Accord, City of Denver v. Porter,
126 Fed. 293 (8th Cir. 1903).
154 City and County of Denver v. Ristau, 95 Colo. 118, 33 P.2d 387 (1934). Compare Esquibel v.
City and County of Denver, 112 Colo. 546, 151 P.2d 757 (1944) (attractive nuisance sole issue) where
the plaintiff was injured while climbing upon junked automobiles piled without authorization upon
city-owned land.
155 See text at note 109 supra.
156 Williams v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567, 129 P.2d 110 (1942) (dictum); City of Fort Collins
v. Roten, 72 Colo. 182, 210 Pac. 326 (1922) (plaintiff while sliding lost his finger when projecting bolt
caught ring); City of Canon City v. Cox, 55 Colo. 264, 133 Pac. 1040 (1913) (defective playground
equipment) (court felt that $8,000 not excessive damages for loss of arm of seven year-old girl).
157 City of Denver v. Spencer, 34 Colo. 270, 82 P.2d 590 (1905) (stage in park collapsed).
158 City of Longmont v. Swearingen, 81 Colo. 246, 254 Poc. 1000 (1927).
159 89 Colo. 246, 1 P.2d 922 (1931).
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icipality has been often held by this court to be a corporate
matter for which liability may in proper cases be imposed,
but the making and enforcing of "ordinances regulating
the use of streets brings into exercise governmental and not
corporate powers ....
Similarly another case161 involving a close distinction between governmental and corporate functions held that although a municipality was liable for the negligent operation of a public park, supervision of park activities is a governmental function.
Another case concerned with this "gray area" is City and County of Denver v. Maurer.162 City employees engaged in cleaning out
storm sewers in the downtown area had connected a fire hose and
laid it out across the sidewalk to the street. As the plaintiff approached the workmen, one of them pulled the hose and struck the
plaintiff with it. The city attempted to show that the activity was
one concerned with the public health and therefore governmental in
nature. The court refuted the argument of the city by saying:
[0] ften some detail in the performance of one class of
general duties partakes partly or wholly of the nature of
another class of general duties. Thus frequently details in
the performance of the general duty of caring for the
streets partake of the nature of duties performed in the
preservation of public health. It also appears that a municipality may be immune from negligence occurring in the
performance of a detail in one class of duties, while it
would be liable for negligence in the performance of a like
detail in another class; as, for instance, while it would not
be liable for the negligence of its firemen in stretching a
hose on a sidewalk while using it to put out a fire, it might
be liable for the negligence of employees stretching a hose
163
on the sidewalk while using it in the care of its streets.
It follows, therefore, that the flushing of that sewer,
though done to preserve health and comfort, was not done
primarily in the performance of the governmental duty relating to the preservation of health, but was done in the discharge of the general duty of caring for the streets .... 114
Dictum in another case1 65 indicated that a city might not be
liable for injuries suffered in a fall caused by stepping into a sidewalk depression used as a watering basin for a tree, if it could be
shown that the planting of the tree was part of an overall plan to
beautify the city.
160 Id. at 248, 1 P.2d at 923, quoting in part from Addington v. Town of Littleton, 50 Colo. 623,
115 Pac. 896 (1911) (city not liable for failure to enforce dog-leash ordinance).
161 Williams v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567, 129 P.2d 110 (1942) where it was held that city
was not responsible for injuries of a skater inflicted by other skaters. The court, perhaps with tongue
in cheek, partially distinguished the instant case with City of Longmont v. Swearingen, 81 Colo. 246,
254 Pac. 1000 (1927), by saying that the cold water there might indicate that the city was at fault.
Yet, Swearingen did not hinge upon the coldness of the water, and the subject was hardly mentioned
there.
162 47 Colo. 209, 106 Pac. 875 (1910).
161 id. at 213, 106 Pac. at 876.
164 Id. at 214-15, 106 Pac. at 877.
165 Belcaro Realty Inv.Co. v. Norton, 103 Colo. 485, 87 P.2d 1114 (1939).
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It is well settled in Colorado that the failure of the city to en166
The
force an ordinance does not give rise to an action in tort.
powers of a municipality which are of a public and general character are to be exercised by virtue of certain attributes of sovereignty delegated to it by the state. These powers are for the welfare and
attaches for either nonprotection of the citizens, and no
167 liability
user or mis-user of these powers.
The municipality has a limited power to abate public nuisances. 6 The abatement of such a nuisance is solely discretionary,
and the city has no duty imposed upon it to act. This nuisance,
however, must not be created or maintained by the express authority of the city, nor may it be the result of any act or omission in the
performance of a duty imposed upon the city. 169 Should the city
declare that a privately owned building is a nuisance, and destroys
it on this ground, the city will be held liable should it be shown
that the offending building was not a nuisance in fact. The owner
of such a building will be given compensation, if not in damages
for the tort, then by virtue of the constitutional provision requiring
170
payment for the taking of private property for public use.
GOVERNMENTAL

POWERS

The rule which determines the liability or non-liability
of a municipality in cases of this nature is the character of
the duty performed, rather than the department, officer, 1or7
agent of the corporation by whom the duty is performed. '
The rule quoted has been substantially followed in Colorado for
many years. In distinguishing the "character of the duty performed," language from the earliest 72 Colorado case' 73 concerned
with the issue of municipal tort immunity gives an excellent guide:
Courts have gone a long way in holding cities liable for
the negligent acts of their agents, and they are always holden wherever the acts which are being done . . . are acts for
the benefit . .. of the individuals who are inhabitants of
the municipality. It is on this general principle that a city
is held liable for the care of its streets and sidewalks, for
negligence or carelessness in the construction of its sewers

and drains

.... 174

Whenever we approach the other field, which only concerns the exercise by the municipality of the judicial or
governmental authority which may have been the subject
of power granted, we find the cases almost universally
hold cities are not liable for injuries resulting from negligent acts. The cases proceed on the hypothesis that acts of
166City and County of Denver v. Ristou, 95 Colo. 118, 33 P.2d 387 (1934); City and County of
Denver v. Forster, 89 Colo. 246, 1 P.2d 922 (1931); Addington v. Town of Littleton, 50 Colo. 623, 115
Pac. 896 (1911). See also,Irving v. City of Highlands, 11 Colo. App. 363, 53 Poc. 234 (1898) (no tort
liability for refusing to issue city license).
167 Veraguth v. City of Denver, 19 Colo. App. 473, 76 Poc. 539 (1904).
168 Echave v. City of Grand Junction, 118 Colo. 165, 193 P.2d 277 (1948). Cf., Atkinson v. City and
County of Denver, 118 Colo. 322, 195 P.2d 977 (1948) (city officers shot "plaintiff's" squirrels).
169 City and County of Denver v. Ristau, 95 Colo. 118, 33 P.2d 387 (1934).
170 McMahon v. City of Telluride, 79 Colo. 281, 244 Poc. 1017 (1926).
171 City of Denver v. Davis, 37 Colo. 370, 374, 86 Pac. 1027, 1028 (1906).
172 Up to this time, every pertinent Colorado case on the appellate level had been concerned either
with some defect in a thoroughfare or with flooding from a sewer or river.
173 McAuliffe v. City of Victor, 15 Colo. App. 337, 62 Poc. 231 (1900) where the plaintiff, while
was injured in a fire started by another prisoner.
confined in the jail,
174 Id. at 338-39, 62 Poc. at 231.

DICTA

MAY-JUNE

1960

this nature are for the benefit of the public as well as of
particular citizens, and that they are done in a public capacity, and . . . the city is not responsible
for the negligent
17 5

performance of such public duties. '
It is of interest to note that Mr. President Judge Bissell, in the
instant case, reluctantly granted immunity to the city for its alleged
negligence in permitting a drunk prisoner to set fire to his jail cell
thereby injuring the plaintiff who had been confined nearby. Mr.
President Judge Bissell cast the lot of Colorado into its present
course when he said in closing:
If the question was an open one, I might be inclined
to hold the city responsible. The whole current, and in
fact, the almost unanimous decision, of the courts on the
question forecloses our judgment, and compels us to exonerate the municipality ....

176

Meek v. City of Loveland1'77 was a stirring case in which the
plaintiff sued the city and its mayor, chief of police, physician and
one of its police officers along with the county physician.'78 Several
charges' 7 9 were made, with the chief one of these being that the
plaintiff's leg had been negligently amputated by the county physician. The city and its officers were charged with liability on
grounds that the amputation was the proximate result of their forcible removal of the plaintiff to the county farm. Prior to the offering
of evidence in the trial below, the court granted the city's motion
for dismissal as to the city despite objections by the plaintiff. The
Colorado Supreme Court gave only token notice to the dismissal of
the city, and merely states without discussion that the city could
not be charged with the torts of its officers. The gist of the instant
case was that the city's doctor and chief of police had acted at their
peril, and they were liable for the negligence of the county physician. This case viewed in the light of the subsequent cases 80 must
be considered as inferentially holding that the municipality is not
liable for the wrongful acts of its officials and agents whether such
acts are within or without their scope of authority.
City and County of Denver v. Mason'"' involved a routine complaint alleging negligence by the city in installing and permitting
an undersized drain to remain in service. The case is of little sig175 Id. at 339, 62 Pac. at 231.
176 Id. at 341, 62 Pac. at 232.
177 85 Colo. 346, 276 Pac. 30 (1929). The plaintiff was shot in the knee by the police officer as the
plaintiff fled following an alleged attempt to burglarize a store. The bullet was removed at the hospital and the plaintiff was taken home. A few days later, city physician and chief of police forcibly
removed the plaintiff from his home and took him to the county farm where the amputation was performed. The plaintiff was confined for seven weeks before he was arraigned on the day before he
was released from the county form. These charges were finally dismissed for lack of evidence in a
subsequent appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court. Plaintiff then brought this action.
178 The case was dismissed as against the mayor and the policeman, both of whom had died prior
to the trial.
179 Plaintiff's complaint charged (1) conspiracy to imprison him, (2) imprisonment to conceal the
wrongful acts and to protect the city from liability, and (3) liability for the negligently-performed
amputation. The first two of these were dismissed by the Supreme Court, and the third charge remanded for new trial.
180 E.g., McIntosh v. City and County of Denver, 98 Colo. 403, 55 P.2d 1337 (1936) (discussed in
text at note 8,5 infra. Compare Town of Colorado City v. Liafe, 28 Colo. 468, 65 Pac. 630 (1901)
where plaintiff was successful in recovering damages against the city caused when city official ordered
him to work in an area known to be hazardous by the official but not by plaintiff; with City of
Greeley v. Foster, 32 Colo. 292, 75 Pac. 351 (1904) where plaintiff was denied relief for injuries
received when foreman ordered plaintiff to work in area which plaintiff knew to be hazardous.
181 88 Colo. 294, 295 Pac. 788 (1931). The plaintiff must have had the patience of Job, for his
property had been damaged in three consecutive years, and the under-sized drain was still in place
four years after the last
flood.
I
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nificance but for the language used by the court in affirming the
plaintiff's judgment. It was said:
Ordinary common sense always points the way to justice. .

.

. Under such circumstances, to permit the city to

escape liability under the cloak of the exercise of a gov8 2
ernmental function would be unwarranted and unjust.

The court during the same year affirmed judgment for the city in
a case involving a collision with a fire department vehicle.18 The
court held that the operation of a fire department was a governmental function and thereby immune from liability for the wrongful or negligent acts of the department or its employees in the performance of their duties. It is interesting to note, however, that
without apparent necessity, the court concluded by saying:
We cannot interfere with this judgment without overruling previous decisions of this cou:t and our Court of Appeals, and this we are not disposed to do, as they are in line
with many decisions in this country.8 4
In an action for malicious prosecution,' 8 5 the court said that a
municipality, being an artificial being, as such could not have a
malicious intent. The court clearly laid out the rules of law pertaining to municipal employees which had been previously applied
in Meek. The court said that officers of a city were not regarded as
agents of the city when their duties were of a public nature, since
the performance of such duties was in the interest of the public.
Should the acts of these officers be wrongful, responsibility would
rest upon the officer alone. The court concluded by saying:
The city, in its corporate capacity, could receive no
benefit from the wrongful acts ...

and it is only when it

acts through its agents in its corporate capacity that it is
answerable to a person injured through the negligence or
misdirection of its servants, and this cloak of protection is
182 Id. at 299, 295 Pac. at 790.
183 Moses v. City and County of Denver, 89 Colo. 609, 5 P.2d 581 (1931). This problem is only of
academic interest now, for Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-10-1 (1953) permits suit to be brought for "any injury
to the person or property of another . . . caused by the tortious operation of a motor vehicle by a
state, county, municipal or quasi-municipal police, fire or health department while engaged in the line
of duty ....
o"
164 Id. at 612-13, 5 P.2d at 583.
185 McIntosh v. City and County of Denver, 98 Colo. 403, 55 P.2d 1337 (1936). Compare Walker v.
Tucker, 131 Colo. 198, 280 P.2d 649 (1955) (false imprisonment suit against town marshal) where
judgment for the plaintiff was reversed and dismissed since the defendant "was acting in his capacity
as a peace officer" for the "benefit of the public." The court further said that the town could not be
liable because the defendant was not acting as an agent of the town.
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not withdrawn, even for the benefit of an injured
86 person,
when the city acts in its governmental capacity.1
The plaintiff in Barker v. City and County of Denver 87 was unsuccessful in his suit against the city for negligence in putting out a fire
at his home. The fire department for some undisclosed reason connected its hoses to a fire plug several blocks away instead of using
a plug less than a block from the burning house. The fire continued unabated while the firemen sought additional hoses when
it was discovered that they did not have a sufficient number on
hand to span the longer distance. The court held that this was the
performance of a governmental function and the city was therefore
immune from liability.
Schwalb v. Connely 88s was a joint action against the manager
of Denver General Hospital and the City and County of Denver for
negligence in performing an autopsy by mistake on the body of the
plaintiff's husband. Through a mix-up by one of the hospital's
nurses, the body of the plaintiff's husband instead of another body
was tagged for delivery to the coroner's laboratory. The court rested the immunity of the city upon grounds of the general duty for
the "preservation of the public health." The case was dismissed
against the other defendants since the nurse who had actually made
the mistake was not joined. The court held that the doctrine of respondent superior was not applicable to public officials and the employees under them unless these officials had failed to use ordinary
care in selecting the employees, or had either directed or authorized
the wrong, or else had been negligent in their supervision. It is submitted that this case could have been found in favor of the city on
grounds quite independent of municipal immunity. "
Until 1952, nothing positive had been said by the Colorado
courts about limiting the scope of municipal tort immunity. A few
cases, such as Mason and Moses discussed above, perhaps hinted
that the court might in some instances like to impose liability upon
municipal governments, but there is nothing to this effect that one
can point a finger to as a definite sign of a trend. Interesting language appears in a case decided in 1952.1"10 Although the entire case
is concerned with an action to cancel a deed granted to the State
Highway Department, and is therefore dictum in the instant discussion, the tone of the language used therein is of great interest.
Mr. Justice Holland, in reversing judgment for the state, said:
[S] urely it cannot be contended that under our system
of government it was not intended that the judicial branch
of the government stand open as a haven for the protection
of any citizens whose rights have been invaded, whether
it be by an individual or by either of the other branches
of our government. Our courts are to decide the rights of
citizens, whether it be by an individual or by either of the
186 Id. at 406, 55 P.2d at 1338.
187 113 Colo. 543, 160 P.2d 363 (1945).
188 116 Colo. 195, 179 P.2d 667 (1947).
189 Prosser, Torts 44 (2d ed. 1955) in note 67 says that recovery for the mishandling of bodies is
usually denied for mere negligence, as aggravated conduct is lacking. But see Restatement, Torts §
368, comment a (1934) which says, "The right to maintain an action for intentional interference with
the body exists although there was no intent to do a tortious act, as where . . . a surgeon performs
an autopsy mistakenly believing that he is privileged to do so. On the other hand, there is no right to
maintain an action for mere negligence in dealing with the body."
190 Boxberger v. State Hwy. Dep't., 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952).
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other branches of our government. It is with pride that we
say . . . that our courts respond immediately to rescue a

citizen from those holding him under asserted governmental authority and to give him relief as against the sovereign
power if the circumstances warrant. .

.

. The rights of a

citizen remain the same whether they collide with an individual or the government .... 191

In 1957, the Colorado Supreme Court took the next step in reducing sovereign immunity. In Boxberger, the court was assisted
in reaching their decision by the fact that the state, did not stand
to lose any funds of the state treasury should the decision go against
it. In Ace Flying Service, Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture,192
the plaintiff was suing the state for breach of contract. There was
no question but that the state treasury would be reduced should the
plaintiff here win. The possible loss of state funds was somewhat
ameliorated, however, by the disclosure that the legislature had
already appropriated the entire contract sum, and these funds had
been set aside for that express purpose. Mr. Justice Sutton, in
speaking for the entire court, gave expression to what may have
been in the minds of several of his predecessors when he said:
To hold that the state may enter into a contract by
which the other party is compelled to expend large sums
• . . to enable it to perform its obligation, and then arbitrarily repudiate the contract .

.

. would be to sanction the

highest type of governmental tyranny. 193
In discussing the background of sovereign immunity, Mr. Justice
Sutton continued by saying:
The doctrine of soverign immunity from suit has a historical basis steeped in antiquity and antedating the establishment of any organized government on this continent.
...The original basis for the existence of the doctrine ...
was that the king or sovereign could do no wrong, was considered untouchable and above the law. Later in the democracies it was recognized that to permit suits against the
state would result in the depletion of its treasury and of tax
funds necessary for the operation of the government on behalf of all its citizens. The doctrine . . . is also based upon

the proposition that since a democratic state represents the
people an action against it is in effect suing oneself, which
is a legalistic anomaly. 194
He concluded by saying, "All that we are holding, and can hold
here, is that as to the contract entered into between the parties to
this action, the state has waived its immunity from suit." 19 Mr.
Chief Justice Moore, in his concurring opinion, said: "Whatever
may have been the rule heretofore, I am of the firm opinion that
any citizen may resort to litigation to protect his life, liberty or
property even though his adversary be the sovereign state of Colo196
rado."
191
192
193
194
195
196

Id. at 441, 250 P.2d at 1008.
136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957).
Id. at 22, 314 P.2d at 280.
Id. at 24, 314 P.2d at 281.
Id. at 25, 314 P.2d at 281.
Id. at 31, 314 P.2d at 284.

DICTA

MAY-JUNE

1960

A few months later in an action 197 filed to recover monies paid
under protest to the state, Mr. Justice Hall quoted with special emphasis that part of Boxberger 98 concerning the rights of a citizen
as against the state. At the same time, he expressed what may very
likely become a classical phrase in Colorado's legal philosophy. He
said: "In Colorado 'sovereign immunity' may be a proper subject
for discussion by students of mythology, but finds no haven or refuge in this Court." 199
These three decisions, Boxberger, Ace Flying Service and Brush
Racing Ass'n-all within five years of each other-are certainly
food for thought. They are particularly significant in that all dealt
with that most sacred cow of all-immunity of the state-and not
with the lesser degree of immunity granted to municipalities, which
already are considered split personalities. These three decisions are
significant in another direction also. Boxberger was highly qualified and limited in its extent; and it is apparent from the words
used, that the court held it to be very important that state funds
would remain untouched even if the plaintiff was successful. In
Ace Flying Service a new plateau was reached when the plaintiff
was awarded state funds-but these were funds already appropriated and set aside for the particular contract being sued upon. A still
higher plateau was attained in Brush Racing Ass'n where the funds
recovered by the plaintiff were not only claimed by the state as its
own; but also these funds were certainly not appropriated by the
legislature, and may well even have been considered in drawing up
the state's budget.
Although it has no direct bearing on the subject of municipal
immunity, it should be noted that five months after Brush Racing
Ass'n, the now-famous Merris200 decision was handed down censuring the practice of municipal courts imposing criminal penalties
without also granting constitutional protections, and also narrowing
the penal powers of municipalities.
These decisions against the state, coupled with Merris, all help
paint the background to the two latest Colorado decisions on the
question of the immunity of the municipalities. City and Countyl of
Denver v. Austria20 1 involved an action brought by the plaintiff
197 Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, Inc., 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957).
198 Boxberger v. State Hwy. Dep't, 126 Colo. 438, 441, 250 P.2d 1007, 1008 (1952) (pertinent part
of quotation in text at note 191 supra).
199 Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, Inc., 136 Colo. 279, 284, 316 P.2d 582, 585
(1957).
200 Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
201 136 Colo. 454, 318 P.2d 1103 (1957).
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seeking to recover for injuries received when he tripped over a
temporary fence erected across the steps to the city and county
building. The steps were unlighted and no warning of the hazard
was posted. The barrier had been erected by city employees engaged in removing the annual Christmas lighting exhibits. The city
unsuccessfully contended that it was immune on grounds that every
activity connected with the municipal building was a governmental
function. The course of future decisions is perhaps charted by what
was said in this case. Mr. Justice Holland, in championing the
cause of the plaintiff, said:
[T] he general trend of decisions is to restrict the doctrine of governmental immunity and nonliability and construe the doctrine strictly against the city.
[W] e are astonished at how far afield counsel for the
gone in taking the position that the city is imcity have
mune .... 202_
If the city sees fit to carry on other activities, not necessary in the performance of its governmental functions, then
it assumes the risk of liability
for its torts in the conduct
20 3

or operation of such activities..
City and County of Denver v. Madison2 "'14 is perhaps the most

important case concerning municipal immunity to be considered in
Colorado's legal history. The issues are more clearly drawn and
sharply presented than in any other previous case. Although the
issue of failure to promptly notify the city was raised as one of the
city's multiple defenses, 20 5 the court chose to limit the questions before it to two inter-related issues: (1) was the city liable for the
negligence of the hospital's employees, and (2) did the negligent
acts arise out of the performance of a governmental function? The
issue of whether the operation of the hospital was a governmental
function was obviously the key question.
Mr. Justice Moore, in delivering the majority opinion, felt that
Schwalb206 had established that operation of a hospital by a municipality was a governmental function. Mr. Justice Moore ruled
that the Ace Flying Service, Brush Racing Ass'n, and Stone2 0 7 cases
pertained solely to contract actions; and that only through legislative action, could the cloak of tort immunity be lifted.
The three dissenting members of the court unfortunately split
into two independent camps. Mr. Justice Frantz, with Mr. Justice
Hall concurring, lashed out at the entire concept of sovereign immunity-"a doctrine . . . that should have died aborning. ' 2 - 18 In an
eloquent discussion of the historical background of the rule, he attacked it as an anachronism, and, almost bitterly, said, "This court
has held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is no longer in
202 Id. at 456, 318 P.2d at 1103.
203 Id. at 457, 318 P.2d at 1103.
204 12 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 238 (1960) (4.3 decision). The plaintiff's six month-old daughter
was undergoing charity treatment at Denver General Hospital. A steam vaporizer being used in the
treatment sprayed hot steam over the baby while she was unattended. The resulting burns were
alleged to have caused the infant to become blind, deaf, lame and mentally-defective.
205 Notice of the claim was not filed until nine years after the tragic accident. The facts of the
accident were proved, however, by introduction of the pertinent hospital records by stipulation of both
parties.
206 Schwalb v. Connely, 116 Colo. 195, 179 P.2d 667 (1947). See text at note 188 supra.
2017 Stone v. Currigan, 138 Colo. 442, 334 P.2d 740 (1959).
208 City and County of Denver v. Madison, 12 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 238, 241 (1960).
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effect in Colorado. At least
I thought that the axe truly had been
20 9
laid to the root of the tree."
Mr. Justice Doyle's solitary dissent succinctly sketched the legal
history of sovereign immunity from common law days to modern
times, with references to many leading cases and texts to support
his firm conviction that municipal functions should be narrowly
classified as governmental in nature. He felt that the root of the
problem in determining which category a municipal function properly belonged was the ever-increasing assumption of activities by
municipalities. This confusion could be eliminated, Mr. Justice
Doyle said, by confining the category of governmental functions to
those acts historically performed by a municipality. Thus, it would
follow that, when a municipality took over a service ordinarily performed by private enterprise, the assumption of such an activity
would show an intention to give a right of action for negligence in
this enterprise. It is submitted that Mr. Justice Doyle's dissent is a
model judicial opinion and should be read as a concise, but inclusive, sketch of the entire field.
It should be noted that both the majority members of the court
and Mr. Justice Doyle felt that only by legislative action could
sovereign immunity be abandoned. Mr. Justice Frantz and Mr. Justice Hall chose to advocate the overturning of the doctrine by
straight-forward judicial action. It would appear that Madison has
abruptly halted the progressive crumbling of the walls of sovereign
immunity.
CONCLUSION

The tower of sovereign immunity may topple in time if the
courts continue to whittle slowly away at its supports. It is submitted, however, that action by the legislature would be preferable.
The state legislature should make a complete appraisal of the doctrine, examine what other states have done, and then enact legislation which will correct the inequities of the archaic doctrine. Full
protection should be given to all levels of government as far as
necessary to insure the continued guidance of the over-all policies.
The public should not object to complete immunity for the use of,
or failure to use, discretionary powers; nor would there be much
objection to immunity being continued in the public safety areas,
e.g., fire and police activities. There is no reason, however, for the
protection presently granted to the municipalities where their officials and servants exceed their powers such as in the McAuliffe 210
case, or in the McMahon2 1, Meek,212 and McIntosh-1 3 cases. Throwing open the door would not result in the always-feared avalanche
of cases, for adequate safeguards would still remain in our normal
judicial processes and rules; but the citizen would thereby be given
adequate protection of his rights.
Viewing the entire problem abstractly, there is no logical reason, aside from the well-worn but nebulous rule of stare decisis,
why a private citizen should not be permitted to sue freely any gov209 Id.

at 243.

210 McAuliffe v. City of Victor, 15 Colo. App. 337, 62 Poc. 231 (1900). See text at note 173 supra.
211 McMahon v. City of Telluride, 79 Colo. 281, 244 Pac. 1017 (1926). See text at note 170 supro.
212 Meek v. City of Loveland, 85 Colo. 346, 276 Poc. 30 (1929). See text at note 177 supro.
213 McIntosh v. City and County of Denver, 98 Colo. 403, 55 P.2d 1337 (1936). See text at note 185
supro.
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ernmental body from the highest to the lowest tier. Why should a
citizen who is guaranteed all kinds of rights of liberty and private
freedom by his governments, be prevented from the rightful and
lawful enforcement of these rights when the offender is one of these
same governments? Is this not a mockery of our constitutional
rights and protections? It is hoped that soon the governmental immunity shield will be discarded; and that it may truly be said that
the subject of sovereign immunity is only for discussion by students
of mythology, and no longer finds a haven or refuge in our courts.
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COURTS-MARTIAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIANS
STATIONED OVERSEAS WITH UNITED STATES TROOPS
By

JOHN RITTENHOUSEt

The emotionalism which surrounds the entire field of U. S.
Military law makes the problem of the subjection of civilians to
military justice during peacetime difficult to objectively assay. The
major objective of this note is to briefly trace the origin of this
problem. This paper will not consider the recent decisions affecting
active-duty members of the Armed Services overseas and their
amenability to trial by foreign nations' courts. This situation is epitomized by the case of Wilson v. Girard.' It will not be concerned
with the question of an ex-serviceman and his triability by courtmartial for capital offenses committed while on active duty as
raised by Toth v. Quarles,2 nor will it consider the question of
courts-martial jurisdiction over civilian categories in time of war or
other national emergency. 3
The problem of civilian citizens traveling throughout the world
in close company with our Armed Service personnel is peculiarly a
product of our times. Unique, too, is the
size of the dependent4
employee "army" now quartered overseas.
The end of World War II found the United States confronted
with an unparalleled international scene. The "cold war" had
evolved. The dormant antipathy between two conflicting systems
of government became active once more. Basic defense concepts
placed our military forces in globe-girdling locations. The problems
of maintaining a large peacetime military force in positions throughout the world forced a revision of policy respecting civilians. For
purposes of necessity and morale, two high-level policy changes
were made in the role of civilians with the armed forces. First,
civilian technical specialists were employed to aid and support our
field forces. Secondly, civilian dependents were allowed to accompany armed forces personnel during prolonged tours of duty in foreign lands. These changes were made as it became increasingly
clear that the opposing attitudes of East and West were to be with
us for an indeterminate period.
Concurrent with the evolution of this policy on the part of the
Armed Forces, came the move for codification of the military rules
of criminal procedure. World War II had brought to light real and
imagined inequities in the field of military justice. The comparison
between the justice meted out by military law in time of war and
the gentler methods of our civilian courts was striking. A strong
f Mr. Rittenhouse is a student at the University of Denver College of Low.
1 354 U.S. 525 (1957).
2350 U.S. 511 (1955).
3 See, Winthrop, Military Low and Precedents, (2d ed. Reprint 1920, orig. pub. 1896), Vol. I, p.
137, "it need hardly be remarked that the mere fact that a civilian is serving, in time of peace, in
connection with the military administration of the government . . . will not be sufficient to subject
him to military trial for offenses committed during such service." The current Supreme Court opinions
seem content to preserve the distinction between wartime and peacetime control of such civilians,
holding the former (by way of dictum) a constitutional exercise of powers. See, for example, McElroy
v. United States, 359 U.S. 904 (1960).
4 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1959 (80thEdition), Washington, D.C. 1959. p. 394, Table No. 497 indicates that the Department of Defense had 91,376 civilians
working overseas. More recent Department of Defense figures supplied to the Supreme Court in 1956,
indicate that the number of dependents overseas with the Armed Services is about 250,000 in number.
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movement for military law reforms culminated in the adoption of
5
the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FEAR OF MILITARY LAW

The United States and its citizens have had an inbred fear of
military excesses far antedating the military misconduct of the redcoats in Massachussetts Bay Colony, prior to the American Revolution. 6 As English citizens, many had inherited a distrust of military
rule and justice. Military rule, as administered by the English monarchs, was not calculated to breed any love by the citizenry.
Some indication of the dominance and persistance of this feel-

ing pervading American thinking can be gained from this statement
of the United States Supreme Court in 1946:
People of many ages and countries have feared and unflinchingly opposed the kind of subordination of executive,
legislative and judicial authorities to complete military rule
which according to the government congress has authorized here. In this country that fear has become part of our
cultural and political institutions .... 7
The Court stated further that: ". . . the military 'should always be
kept in subjection to the laws of the country to which it belongs,
and that (sic) he is no friend to the Republic who advocates the
contrary. The established principle of every free people is, that the
law alone shall govern; and to it the military must always yield."8
Even with such reservations about military jurisdiction so
prominently in mind, the new-born confederation of colonies found
it necessary in 1776 to bind certain civilians to military law. Thus,
the Continental Congress said that, ". . . all persons whatsoever,
serving with the continental army in the field .. ." should be bound

by military regulations and trial by military courts-martial. This
statement of policy, largely copied from the British military regulations,10 has served as the basis for trial of civilians by military

courts down to the present.
Of significance is a case considered by the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1879.11 This case concerned the plight of a paymaster's clerk in the Navy, serving aboard the USS Essex then stationed at Rio de Janeiro. Accused of malfeasance in his official duties, he was tried and convicted by a court-martial convened by the
commanding officer. However, the admiral in charge declined to
approve the sentence imposed and returned the proceedings. The
court was instructed to revise the sentence upward. In discharging
a later appeal for a writ of habeas corpus, the court said, "The constitutionality of the Acts of Congress touching army and navy
courts-martial in this country, if there could ever have
been a doubt
about it, is no longer an open question in this court.' 2
In placing the paymaster's clerk within the jurisdiction of a
Navy court-martial, the Court supplied as essentially simple a yardstick for the measurement of his amenability to such trial as could
5 10 U.S.C. § 801-940 (1952 ed. Supp V). See text at note 33, infra.
6 Bowen, John Adams and the American Revolution, (1st ed. 1950) pp. 342-405.
7 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 320 (1946).
8 Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 159 (1879).
9 Winthrop, op. cit. supra note 4, at 956.
10 Id. at 131.
11 Ex Parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
12 Id. at 21.
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be wished. The determinant was simply the clerk's written acceptance of naval regulations. 13 Another case of similar fact structure a
later served to confirm the stand of the Court in this refew years
14
gard.
WORLD WAR

I

CASES

Though not directly in line with our l6asic restrictions, since the
case occurred in wartime, Ex Parte Gerlach15 should be touched
upon. The defendant, a civilian employee of the United States Shipping Board, was discharged after serving as an officer in the merchant service on board the steamship McClellan on an eastward
voyage to Europe. After discharge, he was sent back to the United
States on an army transport as a passenger. Enroute to New York,
he volunteered to stand watches. A few days later, he reneged on
his agreement and refused thenceforth to stand duty. For this refusal he was tried by court-martial and sentenced to a prison term.
Upon seeking a writ of habeas corpus, he was denied relief.
After quoting the second Article of War, 16 the court said that:
The Articles were enacted in pursuance of the general war
power, and ought to be given a broad scope in order to afford the fullest protection to the nation. The act is, in my
13 Id. at 22. The court says, "Their acceptance and agreement to submit to the laws and regulations for the government and discipline of the navy must be in writing, and filed in the department.
They must take an oath and bind themselves to serve until discharged . ..
"If these officers are not in the naval service, it may well be asked, who are.(?)"
14 Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895). The Court says, "He was therefore, as has been directly
adjudged by this court, a person in the naval service of the United States, and subject to be tried and
convicted, and to be sentenced to imprisonment, by a general court-martial...."

15 247 Fed. 616 (S.D. N.Y. 1917).
16 Id. at 617.
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opinion, constitutional. That an officer should be able to
call upon a person accompanying the military forces to protect a transport and its occupants in time of danger, particularly where he had volunteered and indeed asked to
stand watch as Gerlach had, is certainly within the fair object of the Articles of War, and is a reasonable exercise of
authority.1"
Here we encounter for the first time, a tacit admission on the part
of a federal court, that Article Two of the Articles of War then in
effect was constitutionally valid. Since this Article has served as
the basis for the much contended section of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 8 the wartime efficacy of this provision in 1917 has
some significance.
In another case of World War I vintage, 19 the defendant Mikell
was in the employ of the quartermaster at Camp Jackson near Columbia, South Carolina, as a civilian stenographer. It is hard to
imagine a more prosaic job than this, far removed from the strife
of battle and within the territorial limits of the United States. Even
so, Mikell was tried and convicted by military court-martial for
rendering false claims against the government. In reversing the
grant of a writ of habeas corpus, the circuit court made a practical
point when it said,
To hold that a cantonment like this is not within military jurisdiction would handicap military authorities, and
greatly hinder and delay military operations, and would,
in some instances, enable one employed in such capacity to
successfully defraud the government without incurring any
criminal liability whatsoever....

This provision is highly

proper, and manifestly intended to secure honest and fair
dealing on the part of those employed
by the government
20
and should be rigidly enforced.
Other cases of record stemming from the first world conflict
lend little amplification to those already considered. 2' It is readily
seen that these cases in the area of civilian trial by military courts
bear little or no resemblance to our problem of the present day.
They do, however, provide some judicial grist for the mill.
WORLD WAR

II

CASES-AN EXTENSION OF THE PATTERN

World War II cases regarding civilians add little depth to the
picture already painted by the considered cases of the 1917-1919 era.
The military courts were laboring under the same essential regulations. 22 In re DiBartolo,2 3 however, offered an interesting statement
17 Ex Parte Gerlach, 247 Fed. 616, 618 (S.D. N.Y. 1917) (Emphasis added).
18 10 U.S.C. 1 802 (11) (Supp. v, 1952).
19 Hines v. Mikell,259 Fed. 28 (4th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 645 (1920).
20 Id. at 35 (Emphasis added).
21 See Ex parte Falls, 251 Fed. 415, (N.J. 1918); Ex parte Weitz, 256 Fed. (Mass. 1919); and
Ex parteJochen, 257 Fed. 200, 204 (S.D. Tex. 1919), wherein it was said; "That it is not necessary
that a person be in uniform in order to be a part of the land forces, I think clear, not only upon
considerations of common sense and common judgment, but upon well-considered and adjudicated
authority." (Emphasis added).
22 Articles of War 1916, ch. 418, I 1, 39 Stat. 651; Articles of War 1920, ch. 227, sub ch. I I f 1,
41 Stat. 787.
23 50 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
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of the basic philosophy of the American people in reference to military jurisdiction and its limitations. 24 Included too, was an intrepid
attempt to divine congressional intent.25 The denial of a writ of
habeas corpus to a civilian employee of the Army in North Africa
conforms to the pattern set during World War I. Other cases involving a ship's cook,26 a merchant seaman, 27 and a superintendent

on a contract salvage job for the Army, 28 all reached the same conclusion and denied the writ.
From the trends evidenced by the cases occurring during the
two world conflicts, we can see the scope of effectiveness granted
to the Articles of War, Article Two, 29 by the judiciary. On the
whole, the courts during both wars took a practical approach to the
problems raised by the accompaniment of the armed forces by civilians. Cooperation in the principal task of winning the war seemed
to be uppermost in the minds of the courts. Lip service was given
to technical protections granted by the Constitution, but the war
effort came first.
POST-WORLD WAR II CASES-A NEW PROBLEM EVOLVES

With the cessation of open hostilities in 1946, the world soon
found itself divided into opposing camps. As has been mentioned
heretofore, this problem engendered the use of civilian employees
of the Armed Forces and the permitting of civilian dependents to
join their husbands and fathers. The situation raised thereby was
novel indeed.
The first major case encountered is Grewe v. France.30 The defendant, a civilian engineer employed by the Army in Germany, was
charged and tried on a variety of offenses stemming from his firing
of a pistol into a crowded street. At the time of his military trial,
he pleaded to no avail that the court did not have jurisdiction over
him. Upon being returned to the United States to serve his prison
sentence, he sued for a writ of habeas corpus.
In denying his application for a writ, the district court examined many of the cases considered above, and came to the same
basic conclusion as before. In so doing, the court dealt with the fact
that the actual warfare was over in Europe by saying,
Plaintiff here argues that in June, 1946, the shooting
war in Germany was over and that the American Forces
24 Id. at 932. "It is in keeping with the traditions of this peace-loving nation that its civil courts
should not readily surrender a civilian to the jurisdiction of the military. Expediency and even necessity should not dispense with a painstaking examination to determine whether one whose libertiev the
civil courts have been charged to guard inviolate has been properly brought to justice in a mlitary
tribunal."
25 Id. at 932-33, where it was stated, "The 64th Congress made the change when it enacted the
Articles of War of 1916. At the legislative hearings held upon the bill, Major General Crowder, Judge
Advocate General, made statements which are incorporated in the transcript of the hearing annexed
to the Senate Report No. 130, 64th Congress, First Session ..
" (The opinion goes on to quote verbatim much of the General's testimony. He indicated that with respect to Article 2 of the Articles of
War, that the Army wished to include a greater class of heretofore excluded civilians 'accompanying
the army in the field'.) At the conclusion of this testimony, the court goes on to say, "These state.
ments which supplied Congress with the reasons for the executive's desire for the change and the
objects to be attained thereby are very cogent evidence of the congressional intent in adopting these
recommendations. It is manifest, therefore, that Congress deliberately intended to subject to military
authority, in the circumstances specified, not only camp retainers and not only those who serve with
the army but others who accompany it. Such persons must include those who are not employees of
the army."
(Emphasis added).
26 McCune v. Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E. D. Va. 1943).
27 In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252 (S.D. Ohio 1944).
28 Perlestein v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3rd Cir. 1945); cert. petition dismissed, 328 U.S. 822

(1946).
2D Articles of War 1920 ch. 227, sub.-ch.
51) 75 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Wis. 1948).

11 § 1, 41 Stat. 787.
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were no longer engaged in military operations, and concludes that he, therefore, could not be considered as accompanying the army in the field.
Petitioner's argument ignores the other provision of
Article 2 (d), to wit: ".

.

. all persons accompanying or serv-

ing with the Armies of the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States ...31
Another case with a different fact situation reached a similar
result the following year.32 It would seem then, that the pattern of
cases decided immediately after the end of hostilities of World War
II placed their dependence upon the provisions of Article 2 (d)
without any question as to its constitutionality. It must be realized
that the only points of reference were cases which, although they
had been outside the territorial limits of the United States, had occurred in time of war. As the shooting war became more remote,
the question of infringment of constitutional guarantees was raised
with more telling effect.
THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JusTIcE--1950

Our gigantic war effort of World War II embodied at its peak,
some twelve and one-half million men and women in uniform. It
seems only natural that these citizen-soldiers, reared in the ways
of the full protection of civilian court procedures, would react unfavorably to the harsher concepts of traditional military law. React
they did. With the fighting over in Europe and Asia, the nation
once more demobilized, and a horde of interested veterans groups
descended upon Congress demanding reform of military law.
Many a sympathetic ear was tuned in the post-war Congress,
indeed many members themselves were veterans with definite ideas
concerning reforms. For those members of the Congress without
any personal experience, the siren song of ten percent of the population, all of voting age, sufficed. Hearings were held; groups were
heard.
From the voluminous records of Senate 33 and House3 4 hearings,
the proceedings of the hard-working sub-committee of the Armed
Services Committee,3" emerged the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The Code was enacted into law on May 5, 1950, and became effective on May 31, 1951.36

The purDose of the Code was to provide a single system of criminal law and judicial procedure for all of the Armed Forces of the
United States.3 7 We are primarily concerned with the features and
31 Id. at 435.
32 United States ex. rel. Mobley v. Handy, 176 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1949); cert. denied, 338 U.S. 904;
reh. denied, 338 U.S. 945. This case involved a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a former post
exchange employee who, while working in Germany, was arrested and confined to a military compound. Defendant fled to the United States where he was arrested. He was being prepared for return
to Germany for trial by courts-martial when he applied for the writ. Relief was denied on the basis
that the Army hod iurisdiction over him prior to his escape from Germany and therefore retained it
upon his apprehension.
33 Senate Hearings Before Committee on Armed Services on S. 857 and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 256 (1949).
34 Full Committee Hearings on H.R. 3341 and H.R. 4080, House of Representatives, Committee on
Armed Services 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
35 H.R. Rep. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949); S. Rep. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8
(1949).
36 Effective that date along with the Manual for Courts-Martial by Executive Order 10214 of
8 Feb 195137 Enacting clause of Public Law No. 506, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (May 5, 1950), 64 Stat. 108 (1950),

50 U.S.C.A. (Chap. 22) 9 § 551-736 (1950 Supp).
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provisions of Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code38 and its ramifications. A comparison of the texts of Article 2 (11) and former Article
of War, Article 2 (d), illustrates clearly the parentage of the Uniform Code provision. To be sure, a certain amount of expansion of
applications to civilians is evident in Article 2 (11). This might have
been expected in light of the changed status of civilians in relation
to the armed forces after World War II.
The underlying intent of Congress in passing Article 2 (11) of
the Code is well-documented. 9 Typical of these expressions of legislative intent is a comment by Congressman Kilday, member of the
House Committee who said:
I agree that persons serving with the armed forces of
the United States must be subject to military law, as they
always have been. We have a different situation now than
we have had
heretofore, with armed service (sic) all over
40
the world.
The congressional intent was again clearly expressed on the subject
during the legislative consideration of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. In explaining the bill on the floor of the Senate, Senator
Estes Kefauver indicated,
If the wife accompanies her husband outside the continental limits of the United States and outside the territories
listed in subsection (11) . . . she will be subject to the uniform code as presented in
this bill, just as she is subject to
41
the military code today.
The major concern evidenced in the testimonies of the various
interested groups (ie.-American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars,
the Army Reserve Association, and similiar organizations) seemed
to be centered upon other matters. 42 Indeed, the committees themselves seemed more concerned with bringing military practices more
38 Article 2. Persons subject to the Code. "The following persons are subject to this code: . . .
(11) subject to the provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a
party or to any accepted rule of international low, all persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the continental limits °of the United States and without the following
territories: that part of Alaska east of longitude 170
West, the Canal Zone, the main group of
Hawlian Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands."
Art. 1, Sec. 8, Cl. 14, U.S. Const. provides: "The Congress shall have Power to make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces."
Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 18, U.S. Const. provides: "The Congress shall have Power to make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof."
39 Supra at notes 33, 34, and 35. Also 96 Cong. Rec. 1357 (1950).
40 Supra at note 34, page 1336 (Emphasis added).
41 96 Cong. Rec. 1357 (1950) (Emphasis added).
42 Supro at notes 33 and 34.
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in line with civilian court procedures, eliminating "command influence" over military courts and generally democratizing the military justice approach. A careful scrutiny of all published testimony
before the House committee 43 indicates little, if any, awareness in
1949 of the problems soon to be created by Article 2 (11) of the Code.
Apparently, the only person testifying that voiced any real concern over the Uniform Code provisions concerning civilians was the
one person most likely to be officially involved with the Code's administration-the Judge Advocate General of the Army. 4 Even he
did not voice his criticism of Article 2 (11) but rather against Articles 2(3) and 3(a) of the proposed Code. These articles gave the
services jurisdiction over former active-duty personnel for crimes
committed against the Code while on active duty. His fears in this
regard were apparently warranted. The subsequent case of Toth v.
Quarles45 so indicates.
From this scant indication of legislative intent, we are forced
to conclude that the law makers believed that they were merely
codifying and incorporating the substantial provisions of Articles of
War, 1916, Article 2 (d). Certainly there is no indication that the
original intent of Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code was otherwise.
POST UNIFORM CODE CASES-ARTICLE

2 (11)

DECIMATED

The first of a recent series of cases in which the Supreme Court
of the United States considered the constitutional questions raised
by the provisions of Article 2(11) of the Code are the much-discussed Kinsella v. Krueger46 and Reid v. Covert cases.4 7 These cases
were considered together since the questions raised, as well as the
basic fact situations involved, were nearly identical.
In Kinsella, Mrs. Dorothy Krueger Smith was convicted by a
general court-martial in Japan for the premeditated murder of her
officer-huband. Sentenced to life imprisonment, her father sued
out a writ of habeas corpus on her behalf upon her return to the
United States. The contention of the defense was that Mrs. Smith,
as a civilian dependent, was not triable under the provisions of the
Uniform Code. The writ was discharged in the lower court.4 Certiorari having been granted directly from the Supreme Court, that
Court in affirming the denial of writ said:
In all matters of substance, the lives of military and
civilian personnel alike are geared to the local military organization which provides them living accommodations,
medical facilities, and transportation from and to the United States. We could not find it unreasonable for Congress
to conclude that all should be governed by the same legal
standard to the end that they receive equal treatment under
43 Supra at note 34.
44 Sen. Hearings before Committee on Armed Services on S. 857 and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 256 (1949). The then Judge Advocate General of the Army, General Green, said: "Articles
2(3) and 3(a) of the code extend milhary jurisdiction over persons not now subject to it. I believe
that this is unnecessary and the inevitolle result will be public revulsion against its exercise. It has
been my experience that no matter ha,
fair and just the system of military justice may be, if it
reaches out to the civilian community, Lvery conceivable emotional attack is concentrated on the
system. This is as it should be . . . . I 1o not advocate that such persons should go unpunished.
I merely suggest that you confer jurisdiction upon Federal Courts to try any person for an offense
denounced by the code if he is no longer subject thereto."
45350 U.S. 511, (1955).
46351 U.S. 470 (1956).
47 Id. at 487.
48 137 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. W.Va. 1956).
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law. The effect of a double standard might well create
sufficient unrest and confusion
4 9 to result in the destruction
of effective law enforcement.
Considering the congressional background of the legislation the
majority went on to express the carefully limited opinion, 50 "On
the question before us, we find no constitutional bar to the power
of Congress to enact Article 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice."51
Mr. Chief Justice Warren with Justices Black and Douglas dissented but did not file their opinions due to pressure of time at the
close of the 1956 term. Mr. Justice Frankfurter filed a reservation
5 2'
citing also the pressure of court business at the end of the term.
53
The second 1956 case, Reid, had a basic fact situation close to that
of Kinsella. The same base line of demarcation was here drawn by
the court, with the same inconclusive results. In addition to the
contention that the court-marial lacked jurisdicion in the first instance to hear her case, defendant raised another question regarding jurisdiction. She maintained that even if the military court had
originally been capable of exercising its control, the Army had lost
this power when she was returned to the continental United States.
This fallacy was quickly dismissed as invalid.
Considered by themselves, these 1956 cases decided by the Supreme Court might cause speculation that the pattern set by the
pre-Uniform Code cases of the lower federal courts was to be adhered to. Not so.
Between the 1956 session of the court which arrived at the tenuous decisions of Reid and Covert, and the 1957 first term, there was
a change in the personnel sitting upon the High Court.54 It will also
be recalled that the dissenting opinions of the Court were not filed
at the end of the 1956 term. They never were. A petition for rehearing was granted in both of these cases. The Court thereupon
reversed its former position just 364 days after it had been pronounced.55
To what circumstances may be attributed such a complete shift
in viewpoint? A perusal of the comparison of the respective votes
of the Justices indicates a partial answer to this inquiry.5 6 The four
1956 dissentors remained steadfast in their views and formed the
foundation for the six-to-two reversal. Add to this steadfast four the
vote of newly-seated Mr. Justice Brennan and the changed mind of
Mr. Justice Harlan and the result becomes obvious.
Why such a marked change in the short span of less than one
year? The majority opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice
Black and concurred in by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Associate
Justices Douglas and Brennan, indicated that the court-martial
49 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 476 (1956).
50 Id. at 474. "Essentially, we are to determine only whether the civilian dependent of an American serviceman authorized to accompany him on foreign duty may constitutionally be tried by an
American court-martial in a foreign country for an offense committed in that country."
51 Id. at 480 (Emphasis added).
52 Id. at 481, 483.
53 Reid v. Covent, 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
54 Mr. Justice Sherman Minton retired 15 October 1956 and was replaced by Mr. Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Justice Stanley Forman Reed retired on 25 February 1957 and was
replaced by Mr. Justice Charles Evans Whittaker.
55 Reid v. Covert and Kinsello v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
56 See chart l(a) accompanying.
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trials of civilians do not meet the minimal constitutional require5

ments of a peacetime United States.
The Court dismissed lightly
the pattern carefully set up over the years by the lower federal
courts. 58 The rather extended attention paid to the "tradition of
keeping the military subordinate to civilian authority. . ... 59 and
like pronouncements lead one to believe that the Court is here resting its case purely upon the foundation of enlightened civil rights
considerations.
The Court, quoting the long-recognized authority of Colonel
Winthrop, said,
We agree with Colonel Winthrop . . . who declared: ".
a statute cannot be framed by which a civilian can lawfully
be made amenable to the military jurisdiction in time of
peace."60
The Court based its decision upon the narrow confines of the
specific issue raised by these two cases. It held that civilian dependents of military personnel who committed capital offenses during peacetime were not within the jurisdiction of the military
courts-martial. In so doing, the Court adhered to' the traditional
ground rules requiring narrow scrutiny of specifics when construing an act of Congress to be unconstitutional.
57 Reid v. Covert and Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1, 19 (1957), "Since their court-martial did not
meet the requirements of Art. III, Sec. 2, or the Fifth or Sixth Amendments we are compelled to determine if there is anything within the Constitution which authorizes the military trial of dependents
accompanying the armed forces overseas."
58 Id. at A-21.
59 Id. at 23.
60 Winthrop: Military Low and Precedents (2d, Reprint 1920), 107.
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In writing his dissent in these cases, Mr. Justice Clark, with
Mr. Justice Burton concurring, said:
My brothers who are concurring in the result seem to
find some comfort in that for the present they void an Act
of Congress only as to capital cases. I find no distinction in
the Constitution between capital and other cases. In fact,
at argument all parties admitted there could be no valid
difference. My brothers are careful not to say that they
would uphold the Act as to offenses less than capital....
All that remains is for the dependents of our soldiers to be
prosecuted in foreign courts, an unhappy prospect not only
for them but for all of us.6 1
It is submitted that the minority view is the sounder, more practical one; and from a standpoint of protection of constituional rights
of citizens it is the preferable approach. The last sentence abovequoted certainly sets the scene for our current dilemma. Further
62
statements from the minority opinion are also worthy of note.
The 1957 reversals by the Court seem to have set the pattern of
reasoning for the immediate future. 63 It is not, after all, a radical
step in logic from the 1957 decisions affecting the trial of civilian
dependents for capital crimes to the set of 1960 decisions about to be
considered.
1960

CASES-COMPLETING THE SQUARE ALMOST

Four cases were argued late in 1959, with decisions delayed until January 18, 1960, which serve the purpose of clarifying and expanding the decision reached in the Reid v. Covert rehearing. 64 The
four cases concerned a civilian dependent convicted of a non-capital
crime (involuntary manslaughter),65 a civilian employee for a capital crime (murder) ,66 and two civilian employees convicted for
non-capital crimes (larceny in the first case, sodomy in the second) .61

The multiplicity of fact situations presented by the lumping together of these cases, the lack of a united majority and minority decision, and the extreme importance of
the cases, requires us once
more to refer to a judicial "score card. '68
69
The first case to be considered concerned a civilian dependent
wife of a serviceman who, along with her husband, was tried by a
general court-martial in Germany for involuntary manslaughter in
the death of one of the couple's children. Both husband and wife
submitted guilty pleas and were sentenced to prison terms. At the
time of trial and thereafter, Mrs. Dial urged that she was not amenable to trial by military court. After her return to the United States
for imprisonment, her mother sued out a writ of habeas corpus
which was granted by the federal district court.70 The government
appealed her release.
61 Reid v. Covert and Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1, 89-90 (1957) (Emphasis added).
62 Id. at 83.
63 See charts 1 (a) and 1 (b) accompanying for comparison.
64 Reid v. Covert and Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
615Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S . (1960).
66 Grisham v. Hagan 361 U.S. . (1960).
67 McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo and Wilson v. Bohlender, 361 U.S .....
(1960).
68 Chart 1 (b) accompanying.
69 Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
(1960).
70 United States ex rel. Singleton v. Kinsella, 164 F. Supp. 707 (SD W. Va. 1958).
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The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Clark, places great
reliance upon the authority of the 1957 cases.7 1 The opinion states:
In the second Covert case, each opinion supporting the
judgment struck down the article (Article 2(11), UCMJ)
as it was applied to civilian dependents charged with capital crimes ....

The briefs and argument in Covert reveal

that it was argued and submitted by the parties on the theory that no constitutional distinction could be drawn between capital and noncapital offenses for the purposes of
Clause 14.72
It can thus be seen that all concerned, the court and government
counsel, had begun in 1957 to spin a fine web of theory which could
ultimately result in but one logical result: the complete banishment
of court-martial jurisdiction under Article 2 (11) of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice for civilians accompanying the armed forces overseas either as dependents or as employees of the armed
forces during peacetime.
The majority opinion here drew a distinction between jurisdiction of courts-martial for capital crimes but not for noncapital
crimes. The Court pointed out that in so doing, there would be
placed in the hands of the military an ability, under guise of mercy, to reduce the crime charged from capital to noncapital73 and
thereby retain jurisdiction which would otherwise be lacking.
The Court quoted Toth v Quarles74 as to the effect to be given
to the interpretation of Article One, Section Eight, Clause 14 of the
United States Constitution. The Court indicated its continuing approval of such a criteria, namely, that of "status". In further defending the majority view concerning the determinant "status", the
court said:
But the power to 'make Rules for the government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces' bears no limitation as to offenses. The power there granted includes not
only the creation of offenses but the fixing of punishment
therefor. If civilian dependents are included in the term
'land and naval forces' at all, they are subject to the full
power granted the Congress therein to create capital as well
as noncapital offenses. This Court cannot diminish and expand that power, either on a case-by-case basis or on a balancing of the power there granted Congress against the
safeguards of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Due process cannot create or enlarge power. 75
This "status" test was not concurred in by two of the justices.
Mr. Justice Harlan, Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring, said in dissent, that the proper distinction was a test of capital crime versus
noncapital crime as committed by a civilian with the armed forces
overseas. 7 6 In the former instance, any civilian regardless of his
"status" should be exempt from trial under Article 2 (11). In the
latter case, according to the dissent, any civilian with the armed
71 Reid v. Covert and Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
72 Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
(1960).
73 Id. at
(Emphasis added).
74350 U.S. 11 (1955).
(1960). (Emphasis added).
75 Kinsella v. Unitde States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
76 Concurring and dissenting opinions, McKlroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo; Wilson v.
Bohlender; Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton; and Grisham v. Hagan. 361 U.S..--- (1960).
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forces overseas should be amenable to trial by courts-martial. One
specific criticism of the "status" test was leveled by Justice Harlan
as follows:
I revert to the Court's "status" approach to the power of
Congress to make rules for governing the armed forces.
How little of substance that view holds appears when it is
pointed out that had those involved in these cases been inducted into the army, though otherwise maintaining their
same capacities, it would presumably have been held that
they were all fully subject to Article 2 (11). Yet except for
their real "status" would have remained the
this formality
77
same.
In this seven-to-two decision, we are confronted with a highly
78
anomalous situation. The majority pays lip service to due process.
Yet the end result of this decision is to allow Mrs. Dial, one of the
defendants, her freedom, while her soldier husband serves out a
maximum sentence for the very same crime. The difference is
"status". I submit that such a double standard is more repugnant
to the American sense of due process than any trial of a civilian under Article 2 (11).
The second opinion of the 1960 series concerning Article 2 (11)
is a consolidation of two cases.79 These cases analyze the problem
of noncapital offenses committed by civilian employees of the armed
services overseas.
The Guagliardo case involved an electrical lineman at a North
African air base who was court-martialed and convicted on charges
of larceny and conspiracy to commit larceny. Upon commencement
of habeas
of his sentence in the United States, he filed for a writ
corpus. The district court dismissed his application, ° the court of
appeals reversed and ordered the respondent dismissed."' The government appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court.
The Wilson case concerned a civilian auditor working for the
Army in Berlin. He was convicted by a general courts-martial on a
guilty plea on three counts of sodomy. Upon arrival in the United
States, he also applied for a habeas corpus writ, which was granted,82 and appealed by the government.
. (Emphasis added).
77 Id. at
78 I. at 304-05, wherein the Court says, "Neither our history nor our decisions furnish a foothold
for the application of such due process concepts as the Government projects."
(1960).
79 McElroy v. United States ex rel Guagliardo and Wilson v. Bohlender 361 U.S.
80 158 F. Supp. 171 (DC Wash DC 1958).
81 259 F.2d 927, 104 U.S. App. D.C. 112 (Ct. App D.C. 1959).
82 167 F. Supp. 791 (DC-Colo. 1958).
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Two new dissenters, Mr. Justice Whittaker and Mr. Justice
Stewart, in application to civilian employees only, expresses the
opinion that such employees are of such "status" as to be amenable
to trial by courts-martial overseas in time of peace. Mr. Justice
Whittaker, in writing the dissent indicated:
There is a marked and clear difference between civilian
dependents 'accompanying the armed forces' and 'civilian
persons' serving with (or) employed by the armed forces
at military posts in foreign lands. The latter are engaged
in purely military work ....
These civilian employees thus
perform essential services for the military and, in doing so,
are subject to the orders, direction and control of the same
military command as the "members" of those forces; and,
not infrequently, members of those forces who are assigned
to work with and assist those employees are subject to their
direction and control. . . . They are so intertwined with
those forces and military communities as to be in every
practical sense an integral part of them. On the other hand,
civilian dependents 'accompanying the armed forces' perform no services for those forces, present dissimilar security
and disciplinary problems, have only a few of the military
privileges and generally stand in a very different relationship to those forces than do the civilian employees .... 83
The two dissentors felt that the powers granted by Article One,
Section Eight, Clause 14, of the United States Consitution, enabled
the Congress to regulate such civilian personnel. The conclusion
reached by the majority was erroneous, said the dissent, since:
(I) t would seem clear enough that Congress could rationally find that those persons are "in" those forces and, though
there be no shooting war, that those forces, in turn, are "in
the field"; and hence Congress could and did constitutionally make those employees subject to the military power.
Both the practical necessities and the lack of alternatives,
shown so clearly by Mr. Justice Clark in the Covert case
(citations omitted), strongly buttress
this conclusion, if, in84
deed, it could otherwise be doubted.
Therefore we see injected into the problem of the jurisdictional
validity of Article 2 (11) of the Code still another philosophy. The
current tests of validity and the supreme court advocates of each
have set forth their views. One more case remains to be considered.
The final case for consideration in this current judicial "ring
cycle" is that of Grisham v. Hagen.8 5 Concerned here is the plight
of a civilian employee of the Army stationed in France accused of
the unpremeditated murder of his wife. He was tried and convicted
by a general courts-martial acting under the authority of Article 2
(11). Brought back to the continental United States to serve his
thirty-five year sentence, he applied for a writ of habeas corpus.
The district court dismissed his application86 and the court of appeals affirmed the denial.8 7 He thereupon appealed to the Supreme
Court.
83 McElroy v. United States ex rel Guagliardo, and Wilson v. Bohlender 361 U.S.
84 Id.

at. (Emphasis

added).

85 361 U.S ... (1960).
86 161 F. Supp. 112 (DC MD Penna 1958).
87 261 F.2d 204 (U.S. C App-3d Cir. 1958).
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The Court, in overthrowing the decisions of the lower federal
courts, utilized the standards outlined for the other 1960 cases here
considered. Since this case involved a civilian employee accused of
a capital crime, an application of the standards set forth by the
various justices resulted in a seven-to-two reversal with Mr. Justice
Stewart and Mr. Justice Whittaker dissenting. The dissent, in applying the obverse side of the "status' coin, would hold a civilian
employee overseas amenable to trial by courts-martial for any offense.
The majority of the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Clark,
indicate that they felt the 1957 Reid v. Covert8s decision to be controlling. Applying the principal determinant of the distinction
formed between capital and noncapital crimes, the court said:
(T) he considerations pointed out in Covert have equal applicability here ....

(we) there held that the death penalty

is so irreversable that a dependent charged with a capital
crime must have the benefit of a jury. The awesomeness of
the death penalty has no less impact when applied to civilian employees. Continued adherence to Covert requires
civilian
employees to be afforded the same right of trial by
89
jury.

Having thus anchored their reasoning to 1957, the majority went on
to grant Mr. Grisham his freedom.
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES

The recent series of cases considered here90 indicate that the
provisions of Article 2 (11) of the Uniform Code have been virtually eliminated for peacetime application to civilians. One question
that then immediately confronts the military is how to fill the
vacuum of policy thus created concerning criminal jurisdiction over
civilians stationed with the armed forces overseas? Or has there
been a vacuum created at all?
Whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of
Forces Agreements9" will still cover civilian personnel stationed
within the various host nations is to be doubted in the light of these
1960 decisions. The NATO Agreement defines 'civilian component'
as: ".

.

. the civilian personnel accompanying a force of a contract-

ing Party who are in the employ of an armed service of that contracting Party, and who are not stateless persons, nor nationals of
any State which is not a Party to the North Atlantic Treaty, nor nationals of, 92
nor
- ordinarily resident in, the States in which the force
is located.
It would seem then, that the NATO Agreements envisaged only
such categories of civilians traveling with the forces of a sending
88354 U.S. 1 (1957).
89 Grisham v. Hogan, 361 U.S.
(1960). The Court continues its pronouncement with a puzzling
statement that: "..... Furthermore, the number of civilian employees is much smaller than the number
of dependents, and the alternative Procedures available For controlling discipline as to the former
more effective." (Emphasis added). Query: How much substance and validity do either of these contentions have? Just how effective are these "alternative procedures" available for controlling discipline, and, for that matter, what are they? Has the Court attempted here to equate constitutional
protection with the number of persons involved?
90 McElroy v. United States ex rel Guagliardo and Wilson v. Bohlender, 361 U.S.
(1960); Grishom
v. Hogan, 361 U.S.. (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel Singleton, 361 U.S .....
(1960).
91 Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding The Status of Their Forces,
June 19, 1951; 4 U.S. Treaties & Other International Agreements 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 (effective
August 23, 1953).
92 Id. Art. 1, para. 1 (a).

DICTA

MAY-JUNE

1960

nation as would already be amenable to the military jurisdiction of
with the provisions of our administrathat sending nation. So also
tive agreement with Japan 93 covering virtually the same provisions
of criminal jurisdiction as does the NATO Agreement. Scrutiny of
the provisions of the agreements between the United States and the
nations basing a major portion of these civilians and comparison
with the tendency of the recent cases as regards such civilians, indicates a possible pattern. It seems likely that the other nations involved could logically reason that such civilians, be they dependents
or employees, will have the same status as any tourist traveling
within that nation and committing a crime against the local regulations.
These agreemerits set forth minimal standards or guarantees to
safeguard the procedural rights of any person tried under them. A
comparison of the rights guaranteed to Americans under the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the NATO Agreements reveals that:
The Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Manual for
Courts-Martial contain all of the safeguards guaranteed by
paragraph 9 of Article VII of the agreement. The code, however, contains the following additional safeguards not
guaranteed by the agreement:
1. A prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination
(art. 31, UCMJ) which is comparable to the provision in
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution that no person
"shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself";
2. A prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
(art. 55, UCMJ) which is comparable to the provision in
the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution that there shall
not be inflicted "cruel and unusual punishment"; and
3. A prohibition against introduction of illegally obtained evidence (MCM, para. 152) which is comparable to
the provision in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution that the right of the people "against" unreasonable
searches and seizures * * * shall not be violated ..... 94
93 Protocol to Amend Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement Under Article III of the Security
Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan, Spt. 29, 1953; 4 U.S. Treaties & Other International Agreements 1846, T.I.A.S. No. 2848.
94 Hearings to Review Operation of Article VII of the Agreement Between The Parties to the North
Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Armed Services, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, 272 (1955).
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The results of this comparison are such as to make it obvious to
even the casual observer that the Uniform Code hews closer to the
line of Constitutional safeguards than does the NATO Agreement.
If such be the case, can it be doubted that it is preferable to be subjected to the requirements of the Uniform Code? Such doubt is apparently evidenced by the Supreme Court.
Since legal writers9 5 and hearings before the Congress9" indicate that there is a direct relationship between the agreements with
foreign nations regarding the scope of their jurisdiction over American military regulated personnel and the guarantees set forth under the Uniform Code, it seems logical to assume that the two would
be difficult to divorce from each other. Yet this is the virtual effect
of the decisions rendered by the court in the field of civilians accompanying the armed forces. Without the foundation of the Uniform Code provisions upon which to lay our reasoning, we have no
alternative but to look to other possibilities of a workable solution.
As was pointed out by Mr. Justice Clark in the 1956 cases, 7 the
provisions of the Code compare favorably with the most advanced
criminal codes of procedure in existence. Certainly the workings of
the Uniform Code are subjected to more substantive and procedural
reviews, both military and civilian, than any other criminal proceedings in the world including our own domestic courts. A cursory
reference to the cases hereip cited should offer ample proof of this.
In considering the plight of the many civilian dependents and
possible methods of now dealing with their criminal infractions,
several possibilities present themselves. They may be enumerated
as follows:
1. The military has the power to forbid the billeting overseas
of this category of civilian.
2. The Congress may make provision for a trial court set up
which would travel the overseas 'circuit'.
3. The military may continue to permit civilian dependents to
accompany their armed services relatives without the protection of
any United States-administered criminal procedure.
95 E.D. Re, The NATO Status of Forces Agreement, printed in Hearings on H.J. Res. 309 and Similar
Measures Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 509-t10, as
follows:
"Sound legal analysis, therefore, would require the conclusion that although a certain immunity
exists for foreign visiting forces, the extent of the immunity is strictly a matter of agreement (Emphasis
added.) It is for the territorial sovereign to determine the extent to which he wishes to waive the
exercise of his jurisdiction. The agreements actually entered into by the nations of the world, and the
decided coses clearly demonstrate that the problem has always involved reconciling "the practical
necessities of the situation with a proper respect for nalonal sovereignty." Predicated upon the foregoing legal analysis, it is apparent that the contention that, in absence of the agreement, the NATO
countries would have no jurisdiction over American forces stationed there is completely untenable .. "
96 Id. at 1043, "the most important of these jurisdictional arrangements are contained in article VII
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement, now in force in most NATO
nations, and article XVII of the Japanese Administrative Agreement ..
" Id. at 1050 "International
law, as reflected in the cases and in the working arrangements, does not appear to support the view
that, in absence of an agreement, the United States would be able to exercise exclusive criminal
the NATO and Japanese agreements require
jurisdiction over its overseas forces.... ""Although
foreign courts to grant certain safeguards to American defendants, they do not guarantee all the constitutional safeguards afforded to defendant in federal or state criminal trials. Most of the countries
in which members of American armed forces are being tried do not provide by their internal law for
such safeguards. The agreements would seem open to criticism, HOWEVER, ONLY IF THEY FAIL TO
REQUIRE SAFEGUARDS GUARANTEED TO DEFENDANTS IN COURTS-MARTIAL. (Emphasis added). Therefore the extent to which constitutional guarantees apply to courts-martial must be determined before
it can be decided whether a failure to assure traditional safeguards affects the constitutionality of the
agreements."
97 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, 478 (1956).
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4. The military may require, as a condition precedent to their
transportation overseas, the signing of a waiver making such dependents once more amenable to the Code.
5. The government may make provision for the return of any
civilian offender to the continental limits of the United States for
trial by a federal court.
It is quite evident at this juncture, that all of the possibilities
contain the seeds of their own destruction. In the first instance, although it is quite evident that the military has the power to prevent
civilian dependents from going overseas as a family unit, such
policy change would place the armed services at precisely the
same disadvantage morale-wise, as they were at the end of World
War II. Since this decision came from the highest level, presumably
there was ample and substantial reason for its institution and substantial reason for its continuance.
The second proposal presents multitudinous problems of policy
factors. Individual treaties would have to be negotiated with each
nation involved, providing for a United States court to exercise jurisdiction on foreign soil. Certainly it would not be unrealistic to envision a request for reciprocity. And should such treaties be successfully negotiated, in what manner would we derive a jury? The
expenses involved would be secondary to the procedural confusion.
The third possibility seems to be, at present, the most likely.
It requires no action at all on the part of any branch of the government. The losers can take comfort in the fact that they are serving
prison terms in foreign lands to engender a greater understanding
of the protections of the United States Constitution.
The fourth possibility, if required, would be certain for a speedy
test before the Supreme Court. Also arising herein would be the
same morale factor cited above.
The fifth possibility would involve such problems as the ability
to obtain foreign witnesses and transport them hither, to keep them
within the jurisdiction of the court for the requisite period of trial,
to allow the jury to see the scene of the crime if that were deemed
necessary by the defense and court, and many more factors which
would pique the imagination of a good defense counsel.
None of these counter proposals put forth as replacements for
the now banished provisions of the Code would seem workable.
How do we now provide for the orderly workings of any criminal
regulations with regard to such civilian dependents? The Court
seems to believe that the way will be found. The pertinent question
seems to be, at present, how do we provide for the punishment of a
premeditated murder at an overseas base perpetrated by a civilian
American and involving only American personnel? To believe that
a foreign court would entertain jurisdiction in such a matter, certain to become an international cause celebre, is to fly in the face
of reality.
What of the category of civilian employees of the armed forces?
Can we say with any more assurance that these persons, with the
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court-accorded "status" of civilians will be treated in any lesser
manner? It seems unlikely that such would be the case under the
rationale of the majority decisions in the 1960 cases.9 8
Semantically, the "status" argument put forth by the majority
of the Court may have validity. Theoretically, the constitutional
safeguards concept invoked by the majority may have validity.
When viewed in the glaring light of possible alternative measures
to insure the administration of justice for all, the better reasoned
view appears to lie with the slim majority of the 1956 cases. 9
98 Cases cited in Note 90, Supro.
99 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470, (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 1 (1957).
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OIL AND GAS-FORCED POOLING-PRODUCTION FROM
POOLING UNIT AS EXTENDING LEASEHOLD ON
UNPOOLED LAND UNDER "THEREAFTER" CLAUSE
By

ROBERT

L.

FRYE$

This comment was prepared in partial satisfaction for the
Rocky Mountain Mineral Laws Foundation Award made to Mr.
Frye.
The plaintiffs gave an oil and gas 1 e a s e to the defendant's
predecessor in interest, for a primary term of ten years "and as long
thereafter as oil or gas is p r o d u c e d from said land." The lease
covered several parcels of land, one of which was noncontiguous
to the others. There was no pooling or unitization clause. During
the last year of the primary term, the defendant commenced
drilling two wells in the area, one of which was on plaintiff's land.
Subsequently, still within the primary term, the defendant obtained
two orders from the C o 1 o r a d o Oil and Gas Conservation Commission pooling various parts of plaintiff's land. Some was placed
in a unit with the well not on plaintiff's land, some in the unit
which contained the well on plaintiff's land. The greater part of the
leased land, including the noncontiguous tract, was not in any
pooling unit. After the expiration of the primary term, plaintiff
sought a declaratory judgment that the lease had expired as to
the lands not included in the units. Judgment was for the defendant
in the trial court. On writ of error, held, affirmed. Drilling a productive well within a pooled unit upon part of the lessor's lands
prevents termination of the lease as to leased lands outside the unit;
further, drilling a productive well within a pooled unit containing
a portion of lessor's lands, but not on lessor's land, prevents termination of the lease as to leased lands outside the unit. Clovis v.
Pacific N. W. Pipeline Corp., 345 P. 2d 729 (Colo. 1959).
It may seem from the statement of the case above that the
court has purportedly decided two questions. This would seem to
be due to the form in which the case came up from the trial court:
the case was submitted to the trial court, as to this court, on an
agreed statement of the facts and issues. However, it is clear that
deciding either question in the affirmative would dispose of the
case.
It might be asked whether there should be a difference in the
answers to the two questions posed to the court. The difference, it
would seem, lies in the fact that when the well has been drilled on
the plaintiff's land, the lessee has complied strictly with the terms
of his lease-oil or gas is being produced from "said land." To hold
that he has complied when the well is not on lessor's land, it must
be held in some way that the well is vicariously on the lessor's
tract.
Nevertheless, the basic problem is that pooling either divides
the lease or leaves it entire. Where the intention of the parties is
t Mr. Frye is/a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
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not ascertainable, and especially where the pooling is compulsory,
the decision would seem to be one primarily of policy.
It is my intention in this paper to first explore some factors
in a lease which might make the lease divisible even apart from the
pooling problem, then to look at the factors which appear to have
been determinative of lease validation in pooling cases, next to
take up the question of policy, and finally, to return to the Clovis
case and examine it in light of the discussion presented.
FACTORS WHICH MIGHT MAKE A LEASE DIVISIBLE
(BUT WHICH SEEM NOT

To HAVE

BEEN DETERMINATIVE)

A. Noncontiguity of Tracts
As was mentioned in the opening paragraph, the lease in the
Clovis case contained a noncontiguous tract, and yet the lease was
found entire. When the pooling problem is not present, and where
the lease does not evince an intention that the tracts be separately
developed, it has uniformly been held that the lease is entire.'
McCammon v. Texas Co.2 presents a particularly strong holding
in favor of indivisibility, in a pooling problem setting. Here two
noncontiguous tracts were leased, and a unitization agreement was
executed by lessor and lessee some years later as to tract A. The
agreement "specifically p r o v i d e d that any part of a lease not
covered by the agreement was to be considered a separate lease
for all purposes

....

"13

Sometime thereafter, but within the primary term, the lease
on tract B was assigned to the defendants. A producing well was
brought in on tract A. Two months after the end of the primary
term, the lessor sent defendants a notice of forfeiture, which was
disregarded. Defendants unitized tract B and developed a producing
well on the unit, thereupon the lessor brought a quiet title action.
In giving judgment for the defendants, the trial court held
that the well on tract A validated the lease as to tract B. Since
defendants were not parties to the unitization agreement affecting
tract A, they were not bound thereby, and the terms of the original
lease were controlling. "(A) 11 the terms of the lease . . . clearly

indicate that the intention of the parties was that, though covering
more than one tract of land, the 1 e a s e was to be developed as a
unit." 4

Hillegeist v. Amerada Petroleum Corp.," although involving a
term mineral interest, is to like effect. Plaintiff owned two noncontiguous tracts of land on which he had given separate leases to
different parties. He thereafter sold a term mineral fee in one deed
covering both tracts, for twenty years and so long thereafter. At
the date of expiration of the primary term, production was being
had on tract A, but not on tract B. Plaintiff, in an action in trespass
to try title, argued that the deed had expired as to tract B because it
was given "subject to" the separate leases, which in legal effect
12 Summers, Oil & Gas 1 295, at 210-11 (perm. ed. 1959); Annot., 11 A.L.R. 138 (1921), and cases
cited therein; Discussion Notes, 5 Oil & Gas Reporter 261 (1955).
2 137 F. Supp. 256 (D. Kan. 1955).
3 Id. at 257.
4 Id. at 259.
5 282 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
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operated to s e v e r the two tracts, so that production would be
required on each tract to validate the "thereafter" provision.
The court, in giving judgment for the defendant, rejected the
plaintiff's contention on the ground that the deed was entire and
given for an entire and indivisible consideration. The parties, by
the terms of the deed, had seemed to intend an entire transaction,
so that production from any part saved the whole. The court had
this to say:
[NJ or do we perceive that w hen the deeds under consideration are treated as if dealing with two segregated
mineral e s t a t e s the situation presented is materially
different in the respects under discussion from that which
exists when a mineral 1 e a s e that is to remain in effect
during its primary term and so long thereafter as oil or
gas is produced from "said land" or from "the abovedescribed premises" is given on two or more noncontiguous
tracts of land; and the law a p p e a r s settled that in the
instance of a lease of the type mentioned production from
any one of the tracts of land described in it serves to perpetuate the lease as to all."
Mention should be made here also of Texas Gulf Producing Co.
v. Griffith,7 in which it was held that production in a unit containing plaintiff's leased lands did not validate the lease as to his
lands outside the unit. Although the decision is based on the constitutional question of deprivation of property without due process
of law, at least two authorities in oil and gas feel that the contiguity
factor may have importance, and cannot be ruled out altogether.'
B. PartialAssignment Clause
Although there was a partial assignment clause in the lease in
the Clovis case,' the court does not even mention it. In none of the
decisions cited in this paper has a partial assignment
clause been
held to make the lease divisible. Summers, 10 however, points out
that "In the situation where the lessor leases a single tract of land,
the lease upon a part of which is later conveyed by the lessee, the
6 Id. at 896.
7 218 Miss. 109, 65 So.2d 447 (1953).
8 Williams & Meyers, The Effect of Pooling and Unitization
Upon Oil and Gas Leases, 45 Calif. L.
Rev. 411, 420 (1957).
9 Record, f. 39.
10 3 Summers, Oil & Gos § 515 (2d perm. ed. 1958).

SAVING MONEY NEVER GOES OUT
Economical Office Space Immediately Available
in the ZOOK BUILDING
Put savings in your own pocket!
Barbershop 0 Bank 0 Snackbar in Building Complex
In and Out Parking-$7.50 per month
-and tenants receive one red stamp for every dollar paid
Contact Dean Zook
Zook Building
431 W. Colfax
AC. 2-8953

MAY-JUNE

1960

DICTA

Louisiana Court has held that a provision which permits partial assignments and allows the partial assignee to extend the lease as to
his portion by paying a proportionate part of the delay rentals
makes the covenants divisible upon assignment." He comments
that this Louisiana view is "questionable.""
The case of Kugel v. Young' 2 also deserves comment in this
connection. A lease containing a partial assignment clause was
there involved. One Young acquired the leasehold interest in a part
of the leased lands by two separate assignments, dated the same
day, relating to land in two different counties. Young tendered delay rentals on the due date, in an amount insufficient to cover all the
land in which he then held the leasehold interest. The plaintiffs accepted payment, but after discovering the error, brought suit to
quiet title. In writ of error they alleged, inter alia, that where one
person is the assignee of separate tracts (separate portions of one
lease) his responsibiliy for rental payments is not separate with
respect to each tract. The defendant, of course, contended that the
lease became divisible since the lands were separately assigned.
Said the court, "This is only incidental, but .

.

. (the defendant is)

in error. While as between the different assignees the lease may
seem to be divisible, as to the lessors it is indivisible, and they are
not obliged to keep track of who acquires interests
therein by as' 13
signment from parties other than themselves.'

Incidentally, it might be mentioned that the lease in Clovis contained a non-forfeiture clause,'14 which would seem to be often concomitant to the partial assignment clause,' 5 and in fact in some jurisdictions is implied if not expressly set out with the partial assignment clause.' 6
C. PartialSurrender Clause
The final type of clause I would explore under this heading is
the partial surrender clause. Although the lease in Clovis contained
such a clause,'17 the question was not raised on appeal, and probably
could not have been; for reasons developed below it would appeai
that drilling on the leased lands would avoid any such attack on the
lease.
Summers' has traced the types of arguments advanced against
leases containing surrender clauses supported by nominal or no consideration. His position is that the arguments are unsound, 9 but in
light of some of the pronouncements of our Supreme Court, the
argument that a lease is an executory optional contract should be
examined.
It was stated above that the lease in Clovis contained a partial
surrender clause. It should be pointed out that the "partial" clause
is no less subject to attack than the "total," because it is obvious
that unless there is some restriction as to how much acreage may be
11 Id.

at 440.

1 6 Id.

at 445.

12 132 Colo. 529, 291 P.2d 695 (1955).
1:1 Id. at 539, 291 P.2d at 701.
14 Record, f. 39.
15 2 Summers, Oil & Gas § 347, at 445-46 (perm. ed. 1959).
17 Record, f. 34.
182 Summers, Oil & Gas H§ 235-36, 242 (perm. ed. 1959).
19 See id. § 242, at 159-61. But cf. Williams & Meyers, supra note 8, at 444, where it is suggested
that a duty of fair dealing may arise from the inclusion of a surrender clause in the lease.
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surrendered (which there was not in Clovis), the whole of it may
be.
The ground on which a lease is attacked as being an executory
optional contract, and so void for lack of consideration, has its basis
in two theories; first, that the interest created by a lease is executory until production is actually obtained; and second, that prospective royalties are the only real
consideration given by the lessee for
2
the privilege of exploration.. 1

In Florence Oil & Refining Co. v. Orman' 1 the first theory set
out above is demonstrated. The state granted a lease to the oil company's assignor in 1894, for a twenty-year term, the lessee covenanting to drill two wells within the first eighteen months, and if those
two were dry, to pay delay rental until he again started drilling.
Three wells were in fact drilled in the first eighteen months, a
fourth in 1896. All were dry holes. The delay rentals are not mentioned in the opinion of the court, so that it is not known whether
they were paid; the opinion leaves the impression that they were.
At any rate, in July of 1900, the board of land commissioners,
without notice, cancelled the lease. In the company's suit to have
the lease reinstated, it was held that the "lease" was a mere license
to explore. Since no oil or gas had been found, no rights had vested
and the lease could be cancelled.
The second theory, that prospective royalties are the real consideration, is demonstrated by the case of Lanham v. Jones,2 where
the following language occurs:
(A) contract such as this ....

which was in fact merely a

naked option, with no definite time of performance, was
terminable by either party in the absence of any interven-

ing equities ....
(I)nstruments of this character are construed most favorably to development, . . . time is of the

essence of the contract, and the real motive for the giving
of such instruments is the development of the leased property. Therefore, such a lease or option is properly construed
strongly against the lessee so as to secure such speedy development. In the instruments before us the supposed
lessees were not obliged either to drill or to pay rental; but
they might, by payment of rental, defer development for all
time, and thus deprive the owner of the land of the principal consideration of the alleged lease.21
Nor would this language seem to be completely a relic of bygone
2 4
"
days. In a 1942 case

and again in 1949 2 our court has used lan-

guage very similar in tenor.
It was stated at the beginning of this section that a partial surrender clause probably could not be attacked after drilling has been
commenced on the land. The reason is probably now obvious: the
arguments above are all based on lack of consideration; when the
lessee begins drilling he is supplying the consideration which was
presumably lacking.
20 Id. § 236, at 145.
21 19 Colo. Aop. 79, 73 Pac. 628 (1903).
2284 Colo. 129, 268 Pac. 521 (1928); see Spaulding v. Porter, 94 Colo. 496, 31 P.2d 711 (1934);
cf. Davis v.

Riddle,

25 Colo. App. 162,

136 Pac. 551 (1913).

23 84 Colo. at 133, 268 Poc. at 522.
24 Mountain States Oil Corp. v. Sandoval, 109 Colo. 401, 125 P.2d 964 (1942).
25 Hill v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 119 Colo. 477, 205 P.2d 643 (1949).
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FACTORS WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DETERMINATIVE

A. Interpretationof the Document Authorizing Pooling
This factor would seem to be easily the most important in arriving at the decision whether a producing well in a unit will validate leased lands outside the unit.
1. Voluntary Pooling Cases
Two cases dealing with wells on the lessor's land in the unit
were discussed above.2 s Both hold that the intention of the parties,
as found in the lease or the pooling instrument, will be controlling.
Similar holdings are found in cases involving producing wells
not on the lessor's land, but in a unit with it. Buchanan v. Sinclair
Oil & Gas Co. 27 involved a lease allowing the lessee to pool "when
in lessee's judgment it is necessary or advisable to do so ....

If pro-

duction is found on the pooled acreage, it shall be treated as if production is had from this lease, whether the well or wells be located
on the premises covered by this lease or not .... ,,28 The court construed the language as requiring validation of the lease as to all of
29
lessor's leased lands, based on their holding in Scott v. Pure Oil Co.
An Arkansas case 30 involved interpretation of a unitization

agreement, which rather clearly provided that a well anywhere
within the unit would validate leased lands both within and without the unit. There was an additional factor in this case which
might be mentioned: the lease was executed after a spacing order
had been entered, and the court comments on this fact. "The original lease was executed with knowledge that rules of the Oil and
Gas Commission did not allow drilling on the grant .... -31
Trawick v. Castleberry 2 also involved interpretation of a lease
provision, and also held that lands lying outside the unit were extended beyond the primary term by the language of the lease. An
interesting side-light is that the lessee had paid delay rentals during
the primary term, thereby avoiding litigation during that time.
26 McCammon v. Texas Co., 137 F. Supp. 256 (D. Kan. 1955), discussed in text at notes 2-4 supra;
Hillegeist v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 282 S.W.2d 892 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), discussed in text at
notes 5-6 supro.
27 218 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1955).
28 Id. at 439 n. 3.
29 194 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1952), 31 Texas L. Rev. 75.
30 Gray v. Cameron, 218 Ark. 142, 234 S.W.2d 769 (1951).
31 234 S.W.2d at 770.
32 275 P.2d 292 (Okla. 1953).
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on the ground that the
However, the lessor had asked cancellation
33
lease had expired at the end of the term.
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Hutchins34 presents the other
side of the coin-a case where the lessor and lessee had provided
in a pooling agreement that production on land within the unit,
even if on lessor's land, would not validate the lease as to lands outside the unit. The court gave effect to the clause.
However, at least one case has refused to give effect to the intention 3 5of the parties as expressed in their lease. In Smith v. Carter
Oil Co. the parties agreed that the lessee should have the right to
pool any of the leased land if it were necessary to form a drilling
unit, or to conform to spacing orders; however, the lease was to be
validated thereby only as to the lands included in the unit. A part
of the leased lands was included in a unit formed by order of the
Conservation Department. After expiration of the primary term,
lessor brought suit to cancel the lease as to lands not included in the
unit. It was held that since the lands were force-pooled, and not
pooled under the lease, the clause had no effect; the lease was validated as to all lands.
2. Forced Pooling Cases
It would seem that the question of validation of the lease should
be decided by construing the terms of the applicable statute or order in a compulsory pooling situation, and yet it would seem that
more often the courts make the decision on policy grounds. These
cases therefore will be discussed below, under that heading.
B. Good Faith
An excellent discussion of this factor will be found in a law
review article, under the heading, "Duty of Fair Dealing." : 6 It is the
authors' thesis that there is slowly developing a duty of fair dealing
between lessor and lessee:
It is not certain whether the so-called "duty of fair
dealing" is merely an application of the equitable doctrines
of unjust enrichment or is more extensive in scope. It is too
early to define the nature of the restrictions on the lessee's
authority in such terms as "good faith," "fiduciary duty,"
"standard of a reasonably prudent operator having in mind
the interest of both lessor and lessee," or the rules governing "waste" by a concurrent owner. In any event, it is certain that the authority given a lessee by a pooling clause
is somewhat circumscribed
despite the broad, unequivocal
37
language of the clause.
A reference to some recent cases will illustrate the point.
In Gregg v. Harper-Turner Oil Co. 38 the lessor had leased 160

acres to the defendant lessee. A producer was brought in on this
land in 1943. In 1947, after repeated demands by the lessor, another
well was completed, but abandoned as non-commercial. In 1948 the
33 Cf. Hill v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 119 Colo. 477, 205 P.2d 643 (1949), noted in text at note 54
infra.
34 217 Miss. 636, 64 So. 2d 733 (1953).
35 104 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. La. 1952).
36 Williams & Meyers, supro note 8, at 439.
37 Id. at 444. (Footnotes onitted.) See also Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration,
34 Texas L. Rev. 553 (1956).
38 199 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1952), 32 Texas L.Rev. 133 (1953).
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state Corporation Commission, at the request of the lessee, unitized
forty acres of the 160, which forty contained the producing well.
The other 120 were not pooled. The rest of the land in the unit thus
formed was owned by defendant lessee. At the expiration of the
primary term in 1949, the plaintiff asked cancellation of the lease
on the 120 acres not unitized, on the ground of failure to develop.
The court decreed a conditional forfeiture, dependent on lessee's
commencing drilling within ninety days. In the course of the opinion, the court pointed out that it was in defendant's interest not to
develop because its wells were probably draining plaintiff's lands,
that defendant testified through its officers that it intended to do
nothing about development until offset wells were required by
someone else drilling, that the position of other producing wells indicated that there was probably oil on the land, and that plaintiff's
royalties were substantially reduced by unitization, which was instigated by the defendant.
Wilcox v. Shell Oil Co.3 9 illustrates how strictly a lease may be
construed by a court in order to promote what the court feels would
be fair dealing. Drilling units for certain sands had been established
by commission order in this case, one unit of which included land
of the plaintiff. The oil company brought in a producing well in a
different sand in the unit, not on plaintiff's land, one month before
the annual delay rental was due. Rather than start a new well on
plaintiff's land or pay the $2,750 delay rental, the company exercised an option in the lease to pool plaintiff's land with the producing land. The court held that since the production was had from
sands other than those covered by the commission order, so far as
that order was concerned this was a dry hole. The lease clause provided that production from a well "completed to production on the
unit" would validate the lease. The court said that this well was not
"completed to production" on the pooling unit, because it was already producing when the unit was formed. Therefore, there were
neither operations nor production on the lease on the delay rental
date, and since the rental was not paid, the lease terminated.
The line may sometimes be difficult to draw, however, between
good business and conservation practice, and unfair dealing. In
Boone v. Kerr-McGee Oil Industries40 the lessee exercised a power
in the lease to pool the land with other acreage, just a few months
before the expiration of the primary term. The land was pooled
with other land already producing, so as to save the lease. The court
held in this case that it was done in good faith, not only to save the
lease but to effect proper development and conservation of the
whole pool. In the course of the opinion, the court said:
Had this pooling arrangement been effected when two or
three years of the primary term of appellant's leases remained, there could be no question with respect to the correctness of the decision of Kerr-McGee to produce the entire acreage from this one well and to pay to each royalty
holder his proportionate share of the production. The mere
fact that only a few months of the primary term remained
does not change the basic problem with which Kerr-McGee
39 226 La. 417, 76 So. 2d 416 (1954).
40 217 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1954).
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was faced and does not make arbitrary a decision which
based 41
upon a consideration of relevant factors, was
proper.
It is interesting to note here that the action was brought on the
ground of lack of good faith. Although it denies the relief sought,
the court says, "Where discretion is lodged in one of two parties to
a contract or a transaction, such discretion must, of course, be' 42 exercised in good faith .... All the authorities are to this effect.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Two lines of decisions have developed in the forced-pooling
cases, seemingly without regard to the terms of the statutes under
which the lands are pooled. The first line is typified by Hunter Co.
v. Shell Oil Co. 43 and Le Blanc v. Danciger Oil & Refining Co. 44 In

the Hunter Co. case, the plaintiff lessor sued to cancel an oil and gas
lease as to lands not included in a forced unit, after the expiration
of the primary term. A producing well had been brought in on the
unit, but not on plaintiff's land, within the primary term. It was
held that production anywhere within the unit would validate the
lease as to all lands in the lease. The ground of the decision is that
the lease is not divisible, and that the plaintiff has an adequate
remedy at law if the lessee fails to adequately develop the lands
outside the unit.
The Le Blanc case was a similar fact situation, with the plaintiff raising constitutional questions as to validating the lease on
lands outside the unit. The court reaffirms its stand in Hunter Co.
that the lease is indivisible, and holds that the pooling order is not
intended to affect lands outside the unit-but that all contracts of
lease affecting minerals are subject to the police power anywayin reply to the constitutional objections.
The second line of decision is illustrated by Texas Gulf Producing Co. v. Griffith.4 5 In this case it was held that a producing well
on a unit, not the lessor's land, would not extend the lease under
the "thereafter" clause as to lands outside the unit. The reason for
the holding is that otherwise the lessor would be deprived of property without due process of law. The court also says that this case
was not contemplated in the statute, and that the legislature cer41 Id. at 65.
42 Ibid.
43 211 La. 893, 31 So. 2d 10 (1947).
44 218 La. 463, 49 So. 2d 855 (1950).
45 218 Miss. 109, 65 So. 2d 447 (1953).
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tainly would not intend to extend the lease to lands outside the
unit.
Assuming, then, that the language in a statute does not force a
conclusion either way, what should be the proper decision? Two
authorities in the oil and gas field have taken the position that the
Griffith case is the proper approach. 46 And it is recognized that
validating the lease as to all lands may in some cases be used to
work inequities. Especially is this true in a jurisdiction which would
follow Smith v. Carter Oil Co.47 and refuse to recognize lease provisions specifically relating to pooling.
On the other hand, the lessee would probably have a large investment already made in the pooling unit before this question
would arise; it would seem inequitable to force him to drill on lands
outside the unit solely to keep his lease, particularly if he has been
developing the entire pool. It should be recognized that developing
an entire reservoir may be advantageous to lessors as well as to the
lessee from a business viewpoint. For example, it is not inconceivable that a single lessee having control of the entire reservoir may
be able to command a better price for the product of the wells, with
consequent benefit to both lessors and lessee. Further, the question
of good conservation practices would come into the picture here;
it may be absolutely wasteful of natural resources to force development in such a manner,48 especially in view of the fact that a single
lessee in control of an entire reservoir can, and probably would
want to, apply the most effective conservation measures. He "probably would want to," simply because it is to his economic advantage
to obtain maximum long-term production; he is not faced with the
necessity in this situation of "getting his while the gettin's good."
In addition, as the courts have pointed out, the lessor has the protection of the implied covenants if the lessee attempts to use this approach to his advantage-although we must recognize that the time
and expense involved in bringing suit to enforce these covenants
may be an effective deterrent.
In summary, then, it would seem proper to me to first construe
the statute; if legislative intent is discovered, apply it. If the lease
contains an applicable provision, this should control. If this is unfruitful, the Hunter Co. approach would seem the better reasoned.
Tempering that rule by liberally applying the corrective factors of
enforced fair dealing and cancellation for breach of the implied
covenants, in order to discourage lessees from taking advantage
of
49
the Hunter Co. rule, would give lessors adequate protection.
It was stated above that it is my belief that statutory language
should control in forced pooling cases, just as language used in leases and unitization agreements controls in voluntary pooling cases.
This statement should be qualified in one respect: legislatures
would seldom, if ever, anticipate a problem such as the one under
discussion; therefore, the problem of construing the statute may be
hopeless. This may be the factor which has encouraged courts to
46 williams & Meyers, supra note 8, at 447-49; see Comment, 17 La. L. Rev. 433, 441-45 for a criticism of the Hunter Co. and Le Blanc cases.
47 104 F. Supp. 463 (W.D. La. 1952), discussed in text at note 35 supra.
48 3 Summers, Oil & Gas 0 516, at 444-46 presents a good argument for the conservation approach,
in a discussion of implied covenants.
49 In addition, a new lessor-protective device may be developed, in the farm of an implied covenant of further explorations. See Meyers, supro note 37.

DICTA

MAY-JUNE

1960

make decisions based on what are seemingly policy grounds rather
than construction-of-statute grounds.
Incidentally, forced pooling statutes have been found constitutional in all jurisdictions in which the question has been raised.50
The attacks have been from various angles, including deprivation
of property without due process of law, taking of private property
without compensation, and abrogation of contract rights. The statutes are generally upheld under the police powers, as conservation
measures or as adjustments of correlative rights.51
THE CLOVIS DECISION

As was stated at the beginning of this comment, it would seem
that the court need not have decided the second question presented
to them. It is thus possible that the holding could be classed as dictum, and the court could decline to follow the ruling in a future case
where the issue may be clearly presented.
In the light of the discussion heretofore presented, it is clear
that in my opinion the court arrived at the correct result. However,
this they did without consideration, so far as the opinion of the
court shows, of the statute involved, '12 or of the problems of construction thereby raised.
The statute under which a forced pooling order would be obtained in Colorado reads as follows:
When two or more separately owned tracts are embraced
within a drilling unit, or when there are separately owned
interests in all or a part of the drilling unit, then persons
owning such interests may pool their interests for the development and operation of the drilling unit. In the absence of voluntary pooling, the commission, upon the application of any interested person, may enter an order pooling
all interests in the drilling unit for the development and
operation thereof. .

.

. (Notice and hearing are provided

for.) Operations incident to the drilling of a well upon any
portion of a unit covered by a pooling order shall be
deemed for all purposes to be the conduct of such operations upon each separately owned tract in the unit by the
several owners thereof. That portion of the production allocated or applicable to each tract included in a unit covered by a pooling order shall, when produced, be deemed
for all purposes to have been produced from such tract by
a well drilled thereon.5 3
The problem of construction here presented would involve the
words, "for all purposes," "each . . . tract in the unit" and "each
tract included in a unit." It would seem clear that the statute does
not force a conclusion to the problem presented.
On the one hand, it could be argued that the words "each ...
tract in the unit," or "each tract included in a unit" apply only to
those lands included within the confines of the unit-that a pooling
50 Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 434 (1954); 1959 U. Ill. L.F. 543, 546. For an excellent discussion of the
history and present status of the low in various iurisdictions, see IA Summers, Oil & Gas § 106 (2d
perm. ed. 1954). But cf. Texas Gulf Producing Co. v. Griffith, 218 Miss. 109, 65 So. 2d 447 (1953).
51 1A Summers, Oil & Gas § 106 (2d perm. ed. 1954).
52 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 100-6-4(6) (Supp. 1957).
53 Ibid.
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order creates tracts "included in a unit." This interpretation would
result in validating leases as to all land inside the unit, but as to
none outside (assuming no provision in the lease itself). It would,
in effect, say that a pooling order divides the lease.
On the other hand, it is pertinent to ask what the words, "for
all purposes" mean, if they do not mean "to validate the lease as to
all lands included in the lease." "For all purposes" is strong language, and would seem to lead to the conclusion that the legislature
intended thereby to have operations or production save the entire
lease. Further, it could be contended that the word "tract" in context is ambiguous, and that if the legislature intended to divide a
lease by a pooling order, they could have used words which would
make their purpose clear-"each portion of a leasehold estate," or
some such wording.
Assuming, then, that the wording of the statute does not force
one conclusion, then the decision would properly be made on policy
grounds. This, it would seem, is what the court has done in Clovis.
From the discussion of policy above, it is apparent that my decision
on policy grounds would be to validate the entire lease; this decision is reinforced by a consideration of the purpose of the entire
statute-conservation is the objective, and conservation would seem
to be better served by keeping as much land as possible under lease.
As incidental to this comment, a word of warning might be
added for the benefit of lessees confronted with a situation involving forced pooling. In several of the cases noted herein, the lessee
had paid delay rentals to the lessor on lands outside the unit during
the primary term, while drilling operations or production was being
had somewhere within the unit. By so doing, they put off the day
of reckoning, but eventually the problem had to be faced-whether
the lease had terminated or been validated. The following words of
the Supreme Court of Colorado might be heeded:
Voluntary payment of rental is convincing evidence that
rental was believed to be due. . . . "Nothing to the contrary

appearing, it may be presumed that men of ordinary . . .
business capacity pay their obligations when due, and, assuming that the business of appellant was being conducted
upon business principles and according to the usual and ordinary business methods, we may assume that the payments thus made were on account of some liability then
due growing out of the transaction covered by the lease."
54
54 Hill v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 119 Colo. 477, 493, 205 P.2d 643, 651 (1949).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LIABILITY OF A STATION
OWNER FOR DEFAMATION OVER HIS FACILITIES
BY A POLITICAL CANDIDATE
A North Dakota senatorial candidate, during the course of a
campaign speech over the facilities of the defendant television station, accused the plaintiff of conspiring to "establish a Communist
Farmers Union Soviet right here in North Dakota." The Farmers
Union brought an action against the candidate and the station in a
North Dakota state district court. That court dismissed the action as
to the defendant station on the ground that provisions of the Federal
Communications Act rendered the station immune from prosecution
for the alleged defamation. At the same time, the court held a North
Dakota immunity statute to be unconstitutional. This point was not
assigned as error and hence was not before the North Dakota supreme court by its grant of certiorari. The supreme court affirmed,
holding that the applicable provision of the Federal Communications Act prevented any censorship by the station of political broadcasts and that Congress had thereby granted an implied immunity
from prosecution. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed
in a five-four decision and held in accord with the state courts of
North Dakota that §315 grants a licensee an immunity from liability
for libelous material, the subject of a political candidate's speech,
which it broadcasts. Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union v.
WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
With the advent of radio on the national scene, Congress at an
early date recognized that it could either be extremely beneficial or
harmful as a means of swaying or informing the populace during
political campaigns. In an attempt to insure that this new instrumentality would be used for only legitimate political ends, Congress
enacted the Radio Act of 1927 which provides, among other things,
that any radio station granting time to a political candidate must
grant equal time under the same conditions to all other candidates
for the same office.1 A provision was included which ostensibly prevented any censorship by a station owner. This provision was for
the avowed purpose of preventing any favoritism toward any one
candidate. No provision was included nor was there an express
grant of immunity against prosecution for defamation committed
by a political candidate. A'clause similar to the provision in the
Radio Act was included in the Federal Communications Act of 19342
as follows:
(a) If any licensee shall permit any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a
broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to
all other such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall
have no power of censorship over the material broadcast
under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imI 44 Stat. 1170 (1927), .47U.S.C. Sec. 315 (1946).
2 Ibid.
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posed upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by
any such candidate.
The legislative history of this Act indicates that Congress intended the no-censorship provision to be absolute and to prevent the
censorship of even very obviously defamatory material from political broadcasts. 8 The basic reason for this no-censorship provision
was reiterated in later congressional hearings 4 where it was stated
that the mere threat of a law suit could be used to force a radio station to censor an opponent's speech unduly. Also, a station could
use the threatened law suit as an excuse for being partisan.5 In
view of the above no-censorship provision, it seems strange that
Congress made no provision for granting of immunity to a station
subjected to an action for defamation as a result of a political broadcast under the Act. Provisions which would have had this effect
were discussed and discarded by Congress at the time of the original
Act and subsequently. It has been suggested that the reason for the
failure of Congress to act along this line stems from a doubt as to
its authority to do so.6

In one of the first cases arising under Sec. 315 of the Act, 7 a
state court held that the no-censorship provision applied only to
words of a political or partisan nature and granted no privilege to
join and assist in the publication of a libel nor granted any immunity from the consequences of such action. Appeal to the United States
Supreme Court was denied on the ground that the case had become
moot through settlement." This was the first and for many years the
only judicial decision on the no-censorship provision of the Act.9
The effect of this decision was to give station owners limited censorship powers over the scripts of political candidates. Of course, there
could be no implied immunity with the existence of this censorship
power.
Then came the much cited and often maligned 0 decision of the
FCC of In Re Port Huron Broadcasting Co."' In this case, the station
owner, after examining the script of a political candidate as was
the practice at that time as a result of the previously mentioned Nebraska decision, discovered certain remarks of an alleged libelous
nature. Rather than censoring these remarks from the script, the
station owner denied all political candidates access to his facilities
in order to protect himself. This would seem to be allowed by the
language of Sec. 315 of the Communications Act. Two of the candidates then complained to the Commission. Probably because the
station owner had already permitted his facilities to be used by one
candidate, the Commission treated the owner's action as censorship
and ruled that the "no-censorship" provision of the Act was absolute
and meant no censorship of any variety. In order to remove some
of the "sting" from this decision, the FCC then held that Congress
3 Donnelly, Defamation by Radio; A Reconsideration, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 12 (1948).
4 Hearings on S. 1333 Before Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 8&th Cong. 1st Sess. 528
(1947).
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932).
8 KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. Sorenson, 290 U.S. 599 (1933).
9 Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union et al. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
10 Snyder, Liability of Station Owners for Defamatory Statements Made by Political Candidates, 39
Va. L. Rev. 303 (1953).
11 12 F.C.C. 1069 (1948).
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had granted an implied immunity from prosecution under the terms
of the Act. In the words of one writer on the subject:
(The FCC) attempted to skip blithely out of this confinement by gratuitously holding that the federal government
had pre-empted the field of responsibility of station owners
for the broadcast of defamatory statements and had thus
relieved licensees of potential liability
12 for any defamatory
matter broadcast in a political speech.
A Texas station owner, aware of the uncertainties inherent in
the Port Huron decision, appealed to the federal court 13 under the
provisions of Section 402 (a) of the Communications Act. The action was dismissed on the ground that the commission's ruling was
not an appealable order under the Act. In doing so, however, the
court voiced strong disapproval of the FCC decision that a station
owner could not exercise any censorship power over the script of a
political candidate. The dicta of the court in this case 14 appears
even more interesting in view of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent
in the principal case.
In spite of this criticism, the FCC action of declaring the censorship provision of the Act to be absolute was in apparent agreement
with the congressional intent as indicated by the legislative history
of the Act. 15 However, the commission's action of declaring a broad
area of tort law to be pre-empted by the federal government was a
problem of constitutional law which could only be properly decided
by the courts or Congress. Although the commission's ruling was
not appealable to the courts and was not binding upon them, it possessed the practical enforcement power of being able to revoke the
license of a station owner who did not comply with its orders. At
the same time, the ruling that Congress granted an implied immunity from prosecution was a mere gratuitous action and the station
owner could rely upon it only at his peril. The magnitude of this
hazard was illustrated very graphically by the five-four decision in
the principal case. This state of affairs led to congressional hearings
on the Port Huron decision, but Congress still refused to specifically
enact an immunity clause into the Communications Act. The FCC,
reinforced by this congressional non-action, reaffirmed its position
in yet another case.16
This was the state of the law when the defamation occurred in
North Dakota. It was obvious that a clarification was necessary.
Congress had refused to act so it appeared to be up to the courts to
do so. The issues were clearly drawn. On the one side stood fair
play, common sense and that sometimes-fleeting concept called justice. On the other side stood the Constitution with its formidable
array of technical roadblocks which must be overcome in order to
12 Snyder, supra note 10, at 309.
13 Houston Post Co. v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 199, 203 (S.D. Tex. 1948).
14 Id. at 204. ". . . we think it iudicially inconceivable that the Commission, a body of public
servants* * *, with considerations of fair play and just administration in mind, have so ordered."
15 Donnelly, supra note 3.
16 The Matter of the Application of WDSU Broadcasting Corp. File No. BR 449, 7 Pike and Fischer
Radio Reg. 769 (1952).
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pre-empt a field of state law. In fairness, however, one must realize
that the justice was not all on one side in this matter. The innocenet
victim of the defamation would also be wronged by losing his remedy against the station owner. True, the victim would still have a
right of action against the source of the defamation, but in many
situations, this remedy could be woefully inadequate.
The majority opinion in the principal case based its decision
that the censorship provision was absolute and that Congress had
granted an implied immunity from prosecution, on substantially the
same ground as the FCC in the Port Huron case. The dissenting
opinion opposed the pre-emption of state law which granted an implied immunity and at the same time agreed with the majority that
the censorship provision was absolute. This proposition had apparently never been seriously considered by any other writer on the
subject. It was stated that there was no such direct or positive
repugnancy so as to justify a striking-down of state law.
It is submitted that the majority opinion is the only one which
could have been rendered under the circumstances of this case and
that the minority opinion, although perhaps correct on technical
grounds, would have been manifestly unfair to those station owners
who, in good faith, relied upon the ruling of the governing body of
their business. At the same time, it would seem that a more liberal
policy of allowing appeals from administrative agencies to the
courts should be adopted in order to prevent such a dilemma as confronted a station owner before the decision in the principal case.
Dale H. Helm
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